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Europe in the twentieth century witnessed the large-scale displacement 
and mass murder of civilian populations because of their ethnic or national 
identity.  Genocide is the ultimate expression of this form of integral nationalism.  
As a result of the Second World War, the term “genocide” was introduced to 
describe the victimization of nations, and became codified in international law 
and agreements.  The end of the century saw the introduction of a new term: 
“ethnic cleansing”.  This term was used to signify something less than the total 
physical annihilation of a people in the Balkans wars, in contrast to the 
extermination campaign of the Nazis in World War Two, or the Turks following 
World War One.  This work looks at both campaigns, the Nazis against the Jews 
and the Serbs against the Bosnians, to argue, however, that ethnic cleansing is 
genocide.  While much of the debate of the 1990s focuses on body counts to 
justify the distinction between the two, a careful analysis of the original work on 
genocide and the UN Agreement which outlaws such phenomenon reveal that 
this “body count” notion is neither correct nor justifiable.  Similarly, a look at these 
two cases reveals act of genocide developed gradually, rather than as part of 
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The single greatest human tragedy and atrocity in modern history has 
been the Holocaust, the genocide of the Jews and Gypsies of Europe during 
World War Two.  Libraries have been filled about this event, seeking to answer 
the question: Why?  Why did the Germans, with assembly-line precision by 1943, 
gas thousands of Jews every day in the death camps?  Sadly, there is no one 
definitive answer to the question. 
While the Holocaust marked the low point of the twentieth century, the 
peaceful collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of European 
Communism in the early years of the 1990’s marked the high point.  Millions of 
Europeans were liberated from oppression with extremely little bloodshed.  
Europe stood on the brink of a new era.  After forty-five years of living with the 
results of the Second World War, namely, a Europe divided, the Continent could 
begin to put the horrors of that great human tragedy behind. 
Yet within two years, Europe once again witnessed concentration camps 
and genocide.  This time it was in the Balkans.  For the most part, the victims 
were the Bosnian Muslims (although Croats and even Serbs suffered, too) and 
the scene was in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.  Once again, the world 
asked: Why?  Why would a country that was enlightened by the standards of 
Eastern Europe, a country that was multiethnic in character reopen the horrors of 
genocide? Why would Yugoslavia, the one Communist country that defeated the 
Nazis without the Soviet Army, the country that had lived through the ethnic 
atrocities of Croats against Serbs against Bosnians in the 1940’s; why did 
genocide reappear? 
This work will examine the question “How does nationalism become 
genocidal?”  Of particular note is the emphasis in this research question on How, 
rather than Why.  The question of How lets us look at the acts that led up to 
eventual genocide, while the question of Why would necessary have to consider 
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psychological aspects of the participants, both individually and as groups.  While 
this question of Why is without a doubt even more important, attempts at an 
answer are approached via the How. 
Even the question for this work of how nationalism becomes genocidal is 
far too broad.  More specifically, the real question addressed by this work is: How 
did nationalism become genocidal in twentieth century Europe?  To consider this 
more narrowly defined question, this work will look at two cases in twentieth-
century Europe.  The first is the genocide of the Jews and Gypsies by the Nazis 
during World War Two.  The second is the genocide of the Bosnians by the 
Serbs in the 1990s. 
This work will approach the question via the historical discipline, rather 
than a political science.  To answer the question from the perspective of political 
science would require the identification and isolation of variables to attempt to 
determine exactly what combination under which circumstances would produce 
genocide.  It is my belief that such an endeavor is an oversimplification of the 
events of their times.  While it is possible, it is unlikely that the events and 
conditions prior to the Second World War will repeat themselves in such a clear 
way that future political scientists, or politicians, can point to emerging events 
and say “Look! Conditions X, Y, and Z are just like 1936!” 
The two case studies in this work, the Holocaust and the Bosnian 
genocide, are certainly not the only genocides of the twentieth century, nor even 
the only genocides of Europe in the twentieth century.  Leading works on the 
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subject identify more than six cases throughout the century.1  The cases were 
selected because of certain of their unique aspects.  The Holocaust was selected 
for two reasons.   First, it was the most devastating case of genocide in the 
modern world, accounting for at least six million victims.  Furthermore, it elevated 
mass murder to a systematic assembly-line process in a way that was not 
present in any other cases.  The case of the Bosnians was also selected for two 
reasons.  Principally, it was selected because the global environment of the time 
was one of emerging peace.  Unlike the other incidence of the twentieth century 
in Europe, the crisis of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia did not occur against a 
backdrop of a larger European conflict2; rather, by the 1990s the growing 
influence of the European Union3 and relatively bloodless and peaceful transition 
of the rest of the former Communist countries stood in marked contrast to the 
bloodshed of Bosnia. Secondly, this case was selected because it was the first 
(hopefully last) case since the end of World War Two.  While Yugoslavia did not 
suffer the full impact of the Holocaust, it did suffer substantial ethnic violence 
during the War.  Forty-five years is a short time, only two generations. 
The second chapter will discuss the two elements of interest in this work: 
genocide and nationalism.  It will examine in greater detail exactly what genocide 
is, and why ethnic cleansing is genocide.  It will also look at the international 
agreements that specifically address genocide, and those that more generally 
                                                 
1 Norman Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) identifies the following five cases of “ethnic 
cleansing”:  The Armenians and Greeks in 1915 by the Turks, the Jews and Gypsies in the 
Holocaust, the Chechens and the Tatars by the Soviets in 1944, the Germans by the Poles and 
Czechs at the end of WWII, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  Naimark uses 
the term “ethnic cleansing” rather than genocide, a distinction which will be addressed in a 
subsequent section of this work.  However, there are distinct differences amongst the cases in his 
work; the expulsion of the Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example, never 
involved the systematic murder of the victim population that the Holocaust, the Armenian 
genocide, or the Bosnian crisis involved, although hundreds of thousands of expelled Germans 
died of disease and starvation.  Additionally, even the Armenian case is not universally accepted 
as a case of genocide. 
2 Each of the other cases discussed by Naimark were in proximity to larger world wars.  
Although the expulsion of the Germans was technically after the end of WWII, it was 
unquestionably tied to the war. 
3 The Treaty OF Maastricht, signed in 1991, marked a major shift in Europe from being an 
Economic Community to a more sovereign Union. 
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address the laws and customs of war with regard to acts that are genocidal.  
Finally, the second chapter will also consider the unique nationalism of central 
and eastern Europe that contributed to genocide in the two wars examined here.  
In both Germany and the Balkans, the nation existed before the modern states of 
Germany and Serbia, and it was this pre-existing national identity that created 
the states. 
After examining genocide and nationalism in Chapter II, Chapter III will 
turn to the specific case of the Nazi genocide of the Jews during the Holocaust.  
The Nazi campaign of racial restructuring of Europe did not begin with the mass 
extermination of the Jews fully planned and prepared.  Rather, the extermination 
of the Jews came about only after earlier attempts to induce the Jews to 
voluntarily emigrate from the Reich.  During the Polish invasion, Jews were 
executed in large numbers, but the primary goal was to force them to flee, or 
relocate them if necessary.  Finally the invasion of the Soviet Union saw the 
specific targeting of the Jews for mass murder, and at brought to light some 
practical difficulties that the regime was forced to overcome before it could fully 
implement its campaign of mass extermination of Jews throughout the entire 
Reich and occupied territories (the “Final Solution”).  Concurrently the Nazi 
ideology of racial purity was orchestrating the murder of large numbers of 
Germans within Germany in the euthanasia program.  The third chapter 
examines this operation in further detail because it led to the methodology of the 
extermination camps of the east, and because in its later stages Jews were 
murdered using the T4 killing centers solely because of their Jewishness, making 
them among the first of the millions to be systematically murdered for their 
Jewish identity. 
Chapter IV turns to the 1990s Balkans crisis, and examines the genocide 
of the Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims) by the Serbs in Bosnia.  The Serbs’ campaign 
of genocide employed the widespread use of terror to induce the Bosniacs to 
flee.  Among the methods of terror used by the Serbs was the systematic use of 
rape as a weapon of genocide.  In addition to murder, torture, and incarceration, 
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rape was used to both drive off the Bosniacs, and as a form of punishment for 
their existence. 
Finally, Chapter V draws conclusions from the two cases of the Holocaust 
and Bosnia.  Like the Nazis, the Serbs had a campaign of racial restructuring, 
only on a smaller scale, contributing to the argument that ethnic cleansing is not 
separate from genocide.  Both cases had their origins in long-standing nationalist 
hatreds.  However, this hatred did not manifest itself as violence and ultimately 
genocide until the introduction of difficult economic and political stresses.  These 
stresses led to the rise of extremist leaders in both cases..  The willing 
participation of thousands, with the tacit acceptance by thousands more, also 
suggests that the populations themselves bear a substantial share of the blame 
for the crimes of genocide.  Finally, the crime of genocide is being clarified in 
international law, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) continues to try war criminals from the Balkans wars.  Having introduced 
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II. ON GENOCIDE AND NATIONALISM 
A. ON GENOCIDE 
 
1. What is Genocide? 
At first glance, the term “genocide” would seem to be a simply, albeit 
ghastly, word: the killing off of a whole people.  However, this murderous aspect 
is only one part of the overall meaning and origin of “genocide”.  The word was 
first coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin in his work Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – Proposals for Redress. 
Lemkin defined genocide as “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group.”4  He derived the word from the Greek genos, meaning race or tribe, and 
the Latin -cide, meaning killing).  However, Lemkin meant far more than just the 
killing of people, although it certainly entailed killing. Genocide, in its original 
meaning by its creator, meant to “signify a coordinated plan of different actions 
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups 
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”5 
Of significant interest, and relevance, is the recognition that, although 
Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in 1944 as a response against the Nazi 
practices of World War Two, he addressed the international dangers of 
systematic destruction of a nation years prior.  In 1933, at the Fifth Conference 
                                                 
4 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of 
Government – Proposals for Redress, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1944) , p. 79.  It is worth noting that the Nazi genocide of the Jews and Gypsies was a 
part of a larger plan of Hitler’s for the complete racial restructuring of Europe.  See, for example, 
Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims: The Establishment of the New Order (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Co., 1974) and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1996).  At the top of Hilter’s social order was, of course, the Aryan race in a central 
leadership role, followed by related western European and Nordic races in the upper and middle 
classes.  Far below them was the eastern European Slavs and Poles, fit for labor.  Jews, 
Gypsies, and Negros were considered “anti-race” and were ultimately fit only for expulsion or 
extermination in the New Order.  After conquering Poland the Nazis began to actually reorder the 
races by moving ethnically pure Germans back to the Reich, relocating Poles out of the areas lost 
by Germany after World War One, and ghettoizing the Jews to the east. 
5 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p. 79. 
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for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid, Lemkin presented a report entitled 
“Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences 
Against the Law of Nations.”  At this Conference, Lemkin proposed that “acts of 
barbarity” and “acts of vandalism” be introduced into the list of offences against 
the law of nations.  In his 1944 Axis Rule, he specifies that these two 1933 “Acts” 
were “the actual conception of genocide.”6  Lemkin describes “acts of barbarity” 
as 
first and foremost, acts of extermination directed against the ethnic, 
religious, or social collectivities whatever the motive (political, 
religious, etc.); for example massacres, pogroms, actions 
undertaken to ruin the economic existence of the members of a 
collectivity, etc.  Also belonging in this category are all sorts of 
brutalities which attack the dignity of the individual in cases where 
these acts of humiliation have their source in a campaign of 
extermination directed against the collectivity in which the victim is 
a member.7 
Lemkin argues that each of the individual acts is punishable as individual 
crimes under local legal codes; the act of barbarity is the collective sum of these 
individual offenses into a campaign that threatens the law of nations.  In addition 
to these acts of barbarity against the collectivity, Lemkin adds “acts of 
vandalism”, which “take the form of systematic and organized destruction of the 
art and cultural heritage in which the unique genius and achievement of a 
collectivity are revealed in fields of science, art and literature.”8 
Taken together, these two acts (barbarity and vandalism) aim to destroy 
not only the physical individuals of the collectivity; but also the entire social, 
cultural, political, and economic basis of the collectivity of a particular group.  
Lemkin proposed that these two acts be introduced onto the list of the 1927 
Warsaw (1st) Conference of the Unification of Penal Law principle of universal 
                                                 
6 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p. 91. 
7 Raphael Lemkin, “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as 
Offenses Against the Law of Nations” presented at the 5th Annual Conference for the Unification 
of Penal Law in Madrid, October 1933, p. 5. www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-
english.htm.  February, 2005 
8 Lemkin, “Acts” p. 6. 
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repression, meaning that the perpetrator of a crime on the list may be prosecuted 
in the country where he is apprehended, without regard to the country in which 
the crime was committed or to the nationality of the perpetrator.9  An astute 
observer will notice that Lemkin’s proposal is based upon the intent of the 
perpetrator, rather than the act.  He readily admits in his work that the individual 
actions are punishable under local laws, and it is only when “these acts…have 
their source in a campaign of extermination directed against the collectivity in 
which the victim is a member.”  Furthermore, in addressing the act of vandalism, 
Lemkin defines the crime as the “systematic and organized destruction”, which 
would suggest the legal exclusion of spontaneous actions or riots against a 
particular group.  In any event, Lemkin’s proposals at this 5th Conference were 
not adopted, but it is highly significant in the study of genocide that such topics 
were being seriously addresses in international legal forums in 1933, well before 
the atrocities of the Second World War were committed, and even longer before 
they were known.  A serious international treaty against genocide did not become 
formalized until 1948. 
 
2. The United Nations 
In 1946, UN General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) affirmed “that genocide is 
a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns…”10  Under 
this UN resolution, “genocide is the denial of the right of existence of entire 
                                                 
9 The crimes on the original list of universal repression at the 1927 Warsaw Conference were 
piracy; counterfeiting of coins, banknotes, and securities; trade in slaves; trade in women or 
children; intentional use of any instrument capable of producing public danger; trade in narcotics; 
and traffic in obscene publications.  Interestingly enough in 1930 the 3rd Conference added 
“[terrorism]” (including the brackets) to the offense of intentional use of any instrument capable of 
producing public danger.  In 1933 Lemkin then expands upon this “public danger into “general 
(transnational) danger” by arguing that the law of nations is threatened when “general 
(transnational) danger threatens the interests of several States and their inhabitants.  Lemkin 
places the word “transnational” into parentheses in his writing himself.  He then takes this notion 
of a general danger to introduce his proposal to add acts of barbarity and vandalism onto the 
Conference list of crimes worthy of universal repression, also proposing to add the crimes of 
provocation of catastrophes in international communications; intentional interruption of 
international communications; and propagation of human, animal, or vegetable contagions. 
10 UNGA Resolution 96 (I), 11 December 1946. 
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human groups…”11  This resolution then calls for the Economic and Social 
Council to “undertake the necessary studies, with a view to drawing up a draft 
Convention on the crime of genocide…”12  This draft Convention authorized in 
1946 manifested as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (UN General Assembly Resolution 260 (III) A, 9 
December 1948).  The Convention was ratified by the end of 1950, with entry into 
force on 12 January 1951. 
The 1948 Convention expands upon the 1946 declaration of genocide as 
a crime.  First, it specifies in Article I that genocide is a crime under international 
law, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war. Second, it greatly 
expands the definition of genocide as follows in Article II: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following 
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the groups; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group. 
 
On first glance, this “definition” of genocide appears to address the 
immediate physical destruction of the group.  However, a closer study of the 
concept of genocide as presented in this Convention reveals that it is much 
broader than immediate physical aspects. 
The Convention specifies genocide as being “any of the …acts”, not “all”, 
“most”, or even “some”.  Second, it specifies genocide as being “with the intent to 
                                                 
11 UNGA Resolution 96 (I), 11 December 1946. 
12 UNGA Resolution 96 (I), 11 December 1946. 
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destroy, in whole or in part” a group.  This means the genocide does not have 
been successful, nor does it have to include the entirety of the group, just a part 
of the group do to their being members of that group (i.e.: they are being targeted 
because of their membership in the collectivity, not because of their individual 
identity).  The third broad aspect is item (b), specifying genocide causes 
“serious…metal harm” to members.  Thus an act does not have to be a physical 
threat to the group to be genocidal.  Actions undertaken to damage the 
economic, social, or political existence of the group can be argued to cause 
“serious mental harm.”  Nor does the Convention require non-lethal acts to be in 
any way long-term or permanent to be considered genocidal.  Thus we can see 
that the UN Convention lines up with Lemkin’s original concept of genocide in 
1944, in which genocide is far more than mass killings, although that is certainly 
one aspect of its manifestation in twentieth-century Europe. 
However, although “genocide” was not internationally outlawed until after 
the Second World War (1946), Lemkin correctly points out that certain 
international laws under the Hague Regulations outlawed many of the individual 
acts of genocide carried out in wartime. 
 
3. The Hague Regulations 
The Hague Regulations governing the conduct of war on land, adopted in 
1907, were the governing body of laws of war before and during World War 
Two.13  These regulations do not in any way address the internal conduct of 
states.  However, genocide is not about war between armies and states; it is war 
of against a people.  As such, the acts prohibited by Hague against civilian non-
combatants de facto cover those individual acts that make up a campaign of 
genocide. 
Section III of 1907 Hague Regulations (Military Authority Over the Territory 
of the Hostile State, Articles 42-56) addresses the authority, responsibilities, and 
                                                 
13 The full title is Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 
1907. 
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limitations of an occupying military force.  Article 43 states that the occupier shall 
restore and ensure public order and safety “while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country.” 
Article 46 states “[f]amily honor and rights, the lives of persons, and 
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected.  
Private property cannot be confiscated.” 
Article 48 states that “[if]…the occupant collects taxes…he shall do so, as 
far as possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment…in force, and shall 
in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the 
occupied territory to the same extent as the legitimate Government was so 
bound.” 
Article 52 states the occupier “can only take possession of cash, funds, 
and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the state.” 
Article 56 states that “institutions dedicated to religion, charity and 
education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as 
private property.  All seizure of, destruction or will damage done to institutions of 
this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and 
should be made the subject of legal proceedings.” 
 
4. Genocide Versus Ethnic Cleansing 
In recent years the crisis in Europe has been “ethnic cleansing” rather 
than genocide, sparked by the Balkans crisis of the 1990’s.  The question is 
whether ethnic cleansing is the same as genocide under a different name, or if 
ethnic cleansing is something different.  In his work on the subject, Norman 
Naimark argues that they are different, writing that the “new term was needed 
because ethnic cleansing and genocide are two different activities, and the 
differences between them are important.”14 
                                                 
14 Naimark, p. 3. 
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This author disagrees with Naimark’s assertion, and believes that ethnic 
cleansing is one and the same.  However, the author believes that the use of this 
synonym is not due to the desire to substitute a euphemism simply in order to put 
a less ugly face onto modern events.  Rather, it is due to a misunderstanding of 
what genocide is. 
Returning to Naimark, he writes that: 
[g]enocide is the intentional killing off of part or all of an ethnic, 
religious, or national group; the murder of a people or peoples…is 
the objective.  The intention of ethnic cleansing is to remove a 
people and often all traces of them from a concrete territory.  The 
goal, in other words, is to get rid of the “alien” nationality, ethnic, or 
religious group and seize control of the territory they had formerly 
inhabited.15 
Yet it is precisely this “definition” of genocide that Lemkin argued against 
in 1944 (and 1933).  Naimark says that genocide is the “killing off of all or part” of 
a group.  Yet when we re-look Lemkin’s definition it is “a coordinated plan of 
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of 
national groups with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”  He further 
writes that “[g]enerally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the 
immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of 
all members of a nation… [it is] disintegration of the political and social 
institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic 
existence of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, 
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belongs to such groups.”16 
One could certainly argue that Lemkin’s idea of “annihilating the groups 
themselves” is the same as killing, while ethnic cleansing is simply the relocating 
of  the  groups  without  killing  them.  In practice, however, there is no distinction.   
                                                 
15 Naimark, p. 3. 
16 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p. 79. 
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By uprooting a people and relocating them from their homeland, the aggressor is 
in fact attempting to destroy “the essential foundations of the life of a national 
group.” 
Even if we can accept that Lemkin really meant just the physical killing of 
the group as being genocide, we can still compare “ethnic cleansing” to the 
definition of genocide in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as evidence they are on and the same.  
Recall that under the UN Convention, one of the acts of genocide is the causing 
of serious mental harm to members of the group.  One can hardly argue that the 
forced relocation of an entire ethnic population does not cause “serious mental 
harm” to the members of the group.  (Try to imagine being forced out of your own 
house at gunpoint, and not suffering “serious mental harm”.) 
 
B. ON NATIONALISM 
The discussion on genocide brings to light the second aspect of this 
thesis, that of nationalism.  Since genocide involves the destruction of a group, 
either through outright killing or by other means, one can recognize that genocide 
is a form of warfare.  It is not, however, warfare focused on states, which is what 
the various Hague and Geneva Conventions attempt to regulate.  It is a war by 
one people against another people, based upon the national identity of the 
peoples; hence nationalism. 
The two cases in this work, Nazi Germany and the Balkans, were the 
product of a particular type of nationalism; that of the cultural nation 
(Kulturnation); that is, the nation created the state.  This type of nationalism was 
specific to Central and Eastern Europe, in contrast to western European (and the 
United States’ western European roots) verfassungnazion, or constitutional 
nation.  In this latter form, the constitutional state (or legal state, even if it does 
not have a constitution, per se) exists before the “nation” of the people.  While 
the constitutional nationalism of western Europe can be dated in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, the cultural nationalism of Central and Eastern Europe 
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dates from the mid-nineteenth century, and continues in its development through 
the interwar years to the Second World War. 
The idea of Kulturnation is from Johann Gottlieb Herder.  His original work 
sought to link national identity to language in Central and Eastern Europe.  
However, his concept of Kulturnation went beyond simply the language.  The 
second, and more significant, element of Herder’s Kulturnation was folklore.  
Herder believed that the folklore of a people was its common glue that held the 
people together and created its national identity.  In those central and eastern 
parts of Europe, where the majority of the population was illiterate and 
uneducated, the folklore of the people was its informal teaching system.  The 
folklore “taught” or carried forward, the history, customs, and traditions of the 
nation: “All unpolished people sing and trade…the songs are the archives of the 
people, the treasury of their science and religion, their theogony and cosmology, 
the deeds of their fathers and the events of their history.”17  Herder’s 
identification of the language and folklore of the people was intended to identify 
already-existing common peoples, not to create new common identities: “For 
Herder, a people’s identity lay in its folklore, its ancient customs, the historical 
archives by which it might be studied and identified.  Herder’s anthropological 
approach was aimed not at forming the identities of peoples, but at recognizing 
them…”18 This quote about Herder is from Wolff.  By contrast, an opposing 
viewpoint of Herder is found in Berend: “Johann Gottlieb Herder, irritated by the 
absence of a united German state during the eighteenth century, pioneered a 
German national ideology.  He sought to create a spiritual Germany, united in its 
language and literature, which were, for him, the main expressions of a ‘national 
character.’”19  This viewpoint suggests that Herder’s work was for the purpose of 
creating a unified German identity, in direct conflict with Wolff’s view that Herder 
desired only to identify nations, not create them.  It is surprising that Herder’s 
                                                 
17 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 310.  
18 Wolff, p. 311. 
19 Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 54. 
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ideas have such significant impact on Central and Eastern European nationalism, 
yet Berend only makes this one reference to Herder, and in that one reference 
portrays Herder as a German nationalist.  It is this author’s personal opinion, 
considering Herder in Berend, Schultze, and Wolff that Berend’s portrayal of 
Herder is wrong, although his emphasis of language and literature as “national 
character” are the correct elements of Herder’s theory. 
Schulze also discusses Herder and his ideas.  In Schultze, Herder is seen 
much more in the viewpoint of Wolff as an observer and political philosopher 
rather than the German nationalist portrayed in Berend.  Here, Herder’s soul of 
the nation as its language and literature is of greater importance than any 
existing state institutions that are imposed over the nation, because an 
individual’s mother tongue is his for his entire life.  In other words, a man’s state 
can be changed, his nation, through his language, cannot.  “Every human being 
was fated to be a member of his nation and bound to it throughout his life through 
his mother-tongue.  Herder’s view, that states and constitutions mattered less 
than culture and language, reflected the continuing disparity between states and 
peoples that obtained in Central and Eastern Europe.”20 
In contrast to Herder’s theory that the nation already exists within the 
culture and language of the people, Rousseau’s view of the Central and Eastern 
European nations was that is could, and should, be created.  Facing conquest 
and domination by Russia, Rousseau advocated that “Poland” must be created 
within the Poles to preserve it as a nation, “to establish the Republic in the heart 
of the Poles … the unique asylum where force can neither reach nor destroy 
it…If you make it so that a Pole can never become a Russian, I answer you that 
Russia will never subjugate Poland.”21 
These ideas that the nation existed within the people are what led to the 
early twentieth-century nationalism of Central and Eastern Europe.  Prior to the 
                                                 
20 Schultze, p. 157. 
21 Wolff, p. 239. 
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First World War, the majority of the region was under one or another 
multinational empire: Russian, Ottoman, or Austro-Hungarian.  In the late 
nineteenth century, beginning in its modern forms around the 1870s and 1880s, 
national independence movements were emerging.  Following the war these 
national aspirations were achieved to some limited extent, but not all nations won 
states, and few, if any, states encompassed “their” entire nation.  Europe saw the 
creation of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland (again), a separate Hungary, 
and an Austria that wanted to be German. 
While in the West the state existed first and then created the nation 
through institutions and society, in the East it was ideas of the nation and a 
national identity that created the state.  But in Eastern Europe, because the state 
was created out of the ashes of the Great War, the coincidence of timing and the 
relative backwardness of the region caused nation-states to develop in a reactive 
“other way” in response to the threat from the advanced capitalist West.  This 
response led in some ways to the disaster of the interwar rise of fascism and 
totalitarianism in the east, and the Second World War.  However, these forms did 
not come about the same way in Eastern Europe and Central Europe. 
Romania makes an excellent illustration of Kulturnation in Eastern Europe.  
I use this brief example to underscore the point that this cultural nationalism 
leading to fascism was not a unique experience of either Italy or Germany, but 
was pervasive throughout the entire region.  Similarly, this Romanian 
counterpoint also illustrates that the Yugoslavia in the 1990s was not just a case 
of “they’re always been like that”.  Yugoslavia was a similar product of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century cultural nationalism of Eastern Europe.  
Romania in this sense is a decent example to illustrate how ideas, institutions 
and society interacted. 
Like elsewhere in the region, nationalism in Romania sought to merge a 
national identity with a new state, just emerging from the umbrella of imperial 
dominance.  Compared to Western Europe, the East was backwards and grossly 
underdeveloped; it lacked modernity.  Nationalism is an identity of “us” in 
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comparison to, or opposition to, an outside “them”, and for the newly created 
states of Eastern Europe the “them” was the advanced, modern capitalist states 
of Western Europe.  Romania and other new states were faced with throwing off 
the system of the old regimes and coming into the modern world, and needed to 
find its own way to do so. 
When looking towards the west as the “other”, the east searched for an 
alternative to western capitalism, and at the same time an alternative to the 
backwardness of existing conditions under the multinational empires.  Thus 
nationalism in the east had a decidedly anti-capitalist bent to it right from the 
start.  Unfortunately, in Eastern Europe a large percentage of banking and 
business interests were Jewish-owned, allowing the anti-capitalist sentiment to 
have a physical personification of otherness, and easily becoming anti-Semitic.  
To add to the mix, some communists within both Russia and within industrialized 
western countries were Jewish, lending an anti-communist twist to the already 
anti-Semitic nationalism.  And with a lack of a democratic heritage in Romania, 
the threat posed by the western capitalist countries also appeared to be caused 
by democracy.  Thus nationalism in Romania, as in many other Eastern and 
Central European countries, was anti-democratic, anti-capitalist, anti-communist, 
and above all anti-Semitic.  
For Corneliu Codreanu, the founder and leader of Romania’s League of 
Archangel Michael (or “Iron Guard”, as it was known), “Democracy breaks the 
unity of the Romanian people, dividing it into parties, stirring it up, and exposing 
it, disunited, to face the united forces of Judaism…Democracy forms millions of 
Jews into Romanian citizens, by making them their equal.”22  Romania 
nationalists used the ideas of Kulturnation to justify their anti-western position: 
“From its very beginning, the industrial age destroyed our spiritual culture but it 
did not [offer] anything better in its place.  It rather established a false culture, 
which corrupts us,”23 in the words pf Codreanu’s deputy.  This extreme 
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nationalism hated anything modern, in other words, anything industrialized, 
capitalist, and western European.  For the Romanians, like so many others in the 
region, this meant anti-Jewish, and it mattered little the economic differences 
between communism and capitalism: “Communism’s triumph coincides with 
Judaism’s dream of ruling and exploiting the Christian nations,” and communism 
in Romania “would place Romania under the heel of complete Jewish 
domination.” 
The rise of the Romanian national identity was born out of the idea of a 
“different way” than the west.  This idea was that the west was flawed, and the 
western institutions (capitalism) in Romania were inappropriate to the Romanian 
national identity because they were dominated by a foreign (Jewish) influence.  
The contrast that can be seen is that in the west, the national identity was 
created by the society and the institutions of the state to be inclusive of the 
people, while in the east, according to the Romanian example, the national 
identity was created by the idea of the people creating their own state, and their 
own society, in a way that was exclusive of certain elements. 
In between industrialized Western Europe and non-industrialized Eastern 
Europe is Germany, a country with a national identity unlike either the west or the 
east.  Germany was not created by the fall of a dominating multinational empire, 
like those countries of Eastern Europe, but neither was it an existing state that 
created a nation, like the western European countries.  It was advanced and 
industrialized to a western degree by the beginning of the twentieth century, 
unlike its eastern neighbors, yet it still rejected democracy and developed a 
totalitarian fascist regime, like the rest of Eastern Europe. 
 
C. NAZI GERMANY 
The question this work addresses is how the interaction between ideas, 
institutions, and society contributed to the evolution of nations, states, and 
nationalism in Europe between the 18th and the 20th centuries.  In discussing 
Germany, this question must focus on how ideas, institutions, and society 
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interacted to lead to the rise of the National Socialists, with their subsequent shift 
from violence to murder to genocide. 
Two popular myths exist surrounding the rise of National Socialism in 
Germany.  The first is that it is inherent in the Germans to form militant 
governments, and that the subsequent war and genocide were inevitable; that it’s 
something in the German blood.  The second myth is that the Nazi origins and 
rise to power are found in Versailles and the Weimar Republic.  Both of these 
myths are wrong; although the second has some elements of truth to it, the first 
does not. 
The origins of the National Socialism are found in German nationalism 
before the First World War.  The idea of a united Germany goes back well into 
the early to middle nineteenth century, becoming a reality in 1871.  However, in 
the years preceding the First World War, although there was a united Germany, 
a single German identity was not yet a part of the German culture.  It was 
forming, though.  With the mass gatherings and celebrations of the 
announcement of war in July 1914, the German people began to express their 
national identity, their idea of being “German” rather than being Bavarian, 
Prussian, or Saxon.  Even the anti-war protests of July 1914 helped to advance 
the national character.  The people, as a mass, were gathering to express their 
political support, or their political opposition.  The idea of the war as a German 
cause, rather than a policy of the monarchy, allowed the masses to become 
politically mobilized: whether in support or in opposition is somewhat irrelevant.  
The scale and scope of the war in the German society allowed the Germans to 
form some sense of unity and oneness: “World War I transformed German 
nationalism by giving it emotional depth and tying it to social reform and political 
entitlement.”24 
As the war stagnated, the people bore a greater share of the burden and 
the hardship.  Both directly through larger and larger call-ups, and indirectly at 
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home through participation in war-relief organization and rationing, the war was 
waged by the nation, not just by the institutions of the state.  More than anything 
else, the war made the Germans recognize themselves as a nation-state, not just 
the subjects of the monarch.  Because of their sacrifice as a nation during the 
four years of hardship: “[t]he German people had gotten a glimpse of themselves 
as a national compact that existed independently of the monarchy and rested on 
the achievements of ordinary citizens and soldiers.”25  By the end of the war, the 
national pride visible with the mass celebrations of July 1914 had transformed 
the German people into a German nation-state.  Germans recognized their own 
political mobilization, and their ability to shape their own national future without 
the Kaiser.  They had “been transformed by war into an increasingly contentious 
public that had begun to fashion its national and economic destiny by its own 
efforts, that had grown more confident in its ability to do so, and that in any event 
appeared less impressed …by the political institutions of the Kaiserreich.”26 
The defeat and the terms of Versailles did not cause the rise of Nazism, 
but without them Nazism could not have taken hold as it did in Germany.  
Fascism came to other countries in Eastern Europe because of their relative 
backwardness, as a reaction of nationalism against western capitalism.  In 
Germany, capitalism was already well-established prior to the war.  Germany 
was much closer, in that respect, to being in the west then it was to being in the 
east.  However, several conditions in Germany at the end of the war combined to 
create the environment that allowed nationalism to become Nazism, and brought 
Hitler to power. 
First, as already discussed, the nation had become mobilized and found 
its national potential during the war years.  This mobilization of the population 
significantly contributed to the November Revolution with the hand-over of power 
to the Social Democrats.  Added to this were vast numbers of returning soldiers.  
The myth of the “stab in the back” defeat became equated with the socialist 
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government, leading over time to the emergence of right-wing nationalism eager 
to defend against the left, seen suspiciously as communism.  The actual left-wing 
communists were no less hostile to the government.  Thus Germany experienced 
hostility by both the right and the left, both sides armed from the war.  The 
conditions of the post-war period exacerbated the situation by placing extreme 
economic hardships and massive unemployment on both the civilian population, 
which had experienced its political awakening during the war, and on the 
returning veterans who fought the war and felt their sacrifice demanded some 
political expression in post-war Germany.  For the most part, these veterans 
became part of the right-wing Freikorps, or the more numerous Home Guards 
organizations. 
In short, Germany was faced with a mass of harsh conditions (the “sold 
out” peace, high reparations, war guilt humiliation, unemployment, hyperinflation, 
radical communists, socialist, etc.) that overwhelmed its ability to develop into a 
stable democracy along western European lines.  In response, the nation which 
had achieved national self-awareness in the war years once more thought in 
nationalist terms: “obsessed with the integrity of the nation, which appeared to 
have been badly mangled, German nationalists thought in increasingly exclusive 
or racial terms.  They honed an apocalyptic rhetoric of danger and redemption 
and launched vicious attacks on so-called non-German elements – Socialists, 
Poles, and increasingly Jews – that stood in the way of national renewal.”27  
Germany became polarized.  With increasing distrust in the Republic (which had 
never been very popular), which was doing little to ease the conditions 
mentioned above, the population increasingly turned to the left or the right.  The 
National Socialists were one nationalist party among many on the right end of the 
spectrum. What made the Nazis stand out among the rest for attracting 
membership and political power was the oratorical skills of Hitler. 
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Hitler possess in intense ability to appeal to the nationalist sentiments of 
the people, already feeling downtrodden and threatened from the left.  His 
Twenty-five points appealed to all classes on a nationalist platform.  It supported 
private property and individual entrepreneurship as part of the German character, 
while attacking “the idle rich and capitalist exploitation”28, in a word, Jews. 
Hitler and the Nazis did not create the nationalist hatred and racism of 
interwar Germany.  Rather, these elements brought Hitler and the Nazis to 
power.  The combination of a nation that could determine its own destiny, in an 
environment of complete chaos and extreme polarization to the left or right, with 
armed paramilitary organizations and a weak unpopular government with little 
support, are the elements that brought the Nazis to power. 
Like many of the countries of Eastern Europe, the nationalism of Germany 
became increasingly exclusionary.  The theory of Kulturnation, that a man is a 
member of his nation through his mother tongue and will always be so, was 
carried one step further.  A man who is not a member of the cultural nation, Jews 
in particular, could never become a member of the nation.  He would always be 
foreign to the nation.  When this idea of perpetual difference and foreignness is 
superimposed on the years of chaos and crisis that Germany experienced, 
against the backdrop of mass violence and death that the First World War 
introduced to Europe, the mixture can become volatile, and nationalism became 
violent, then murderous, then eventually genocidal. 
Particularly for Nazi Germany, nationalism became a matter of race.  A 
person was either of the German race, or he was not.  Based upon this racial 
identity, the Nazis attempted to completely restructure Europe along racial lines, 
with a set racial hierarchy defined social roles of each race.  The ultimate fate of 
the Jews, considered a “non-race” in the Nazi racial hierarchy, was the complete 
removal of their physical presence in Europe.  The methods for their physical 
removal varied at the outset of the war depending on their location.  Within the 
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Reich between 1933 and 1941 the methods included legal legislation to strip the 
Jews of their status as citizens, and then acts of terror without recourse to the 
law (due to their lack of legal status as citizens) in order to induce their voluntary 
emigration.  For the Jews of Poland after the invasion in 1939 the methods 
included murder, relocation, and ghettoization.  For the Jews of the Soviet Union 
in 1941, the only desired method was murder.  At the same time, the Nazis were 
conducting racial purges within the German race itself through sterilization and 
euthanasia, in an operation that would ultimately lead to the creation of the death 
camps.  This application of racial nationalism will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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III. THE NAZI HOLOCAUST 
One of the key points to understand about the Nazi Holocaust was that it 
came from small, even humble, origins.  The first concepts, eugenics to promote 
compulsory sterilization, were western phenomenon as well as German.  The 
second step, euthanasia, is to a certain extent still an issue even today.29  Nor 
was anti-Semitism itself even remotely the sole purview of either the Germans 
specifically or the totalitarian right in general.  These pieces are significant in 
recognizing that the genocide of the Jews did not simply begin overnight. 
This does not necessarily mean, or even suggest, that without the 
eugenics and euthanasia movements the Holocaust would never have occurred, 
but the early euthanasia programs directly led to the techniques and expertise 
employed in the mass extermination centers.  This work will not even begin to go 
into infinite “what-if” scenarios, but it is safe to say the genocide would have been 
different to some extent. 
Also, one must recognize that the position of the Jews both before and 
during the Nazi years just wasn’t that central of an issue to the overwhelming 
majority of Germans.  Hitler and his National Socialists hardly came to power 
solely because of their anti-Semitic platform.  The voters really didn’t care all that 
much one way or another in the early 1930s.  What the Nazis did offer were 
alternatives to other issues, economic and political, that far outweighed the 
relevance of Nazi anti-Semitism to the average German.30 
 
A. EUGENICS AND EUTHANASIA 
The idea of racial contamination, that “pure” Germans would be culturally 
threatened by exposure to other races, was not unique to the Nazis nor was it a 
notion unique to the early twentieth century.  Although the crisis decades of the 
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1920s and 1930s radicalized Nazi racial policies, the belief in German racial 
superiority existed for at least two centuries. Indeed, one German traveler to 
Poland, Johann Gottlieb Frichte, wrote in 1791 that upon entering Poland:  “The 
first village is Ponikowo, German, but a shudder came over me, especially at the 
sight of the large dogs running freely around…The dress of the peasants takes 
on here already in the first village something wild and neglected.”31  His further 
verdict on the Germans in Poland is that “they are pleasant, reasonable, obliging, 
and polite, only unclean, just like the national Poles, and almost more so, since in 
them it is more striking to a German eye.”32  The author further describes the 
streets as “full of straw, garbage, and manure: and “swarm[ing] with Jews”.33  
One would imagine such statements to be, perhaps, from the early twentieth 
century or late nineteenth century.  One must further consider that Frichte’s 
writings that clearly suggest racial contamination of Germans by Poles and Jews 
predate a German state by nearly a century. 
The early stages of the Nazi racial policies were not specifically targeted 
against the Jews.  They targeted all elements within the Reich that were 
perceived to weaken the race, both Jewish and non-Jewish alike.  Also, the very 
first racial policies that led to genocide were not even intended to kill. 
The first efforts at racial purification were the early eugenics programs.  
The purpose behind these programs was not to kill, but to prevent reproduction 
by those individuals seen as posing a threat to the strength of the German race.  
In July 1933 the so-called sterilization law was passed, which directed 
compulsory sterilization for persons suffering from a variety of mental and 
physical disorders.  In October 1935, the sterilization law was followed by the 
Marriage Health Law, which required screening to prevent marriages of “persons 
considered carriers of hereditary degeneracy, particularly those covered by the 
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sterilization law.”34  However, the drive for eugenics and sterilization was hardly 
an innovation of the Nazis nor was it even a German-originated concept. 
The British naturalist Francis Galton created the term “eugenics” in 1881.  
It was described by the American eugenics proponent Charles Davenport as “the 
science of the improvement of the human race by better breeding.”35   In 1927, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes presented the eight-man majority opinion of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling supporting a Virginia law authorizing compulsory 
sterilization of handicapped patients with hereditary insanity or imbecility.  His 
opinion stated that “it is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society 
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.  The 
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting 
the fallopian tubes.  Three generations of imbeciles is enough.”36 
However, while the position forwarded by Justice Holmes finds its 
justification in the drain on resources i.e. public welfare.  It addresses eugenics 
as an individual basis.  In contrast, by the interwar years, German eugenics 
advocates focused on a racial basis.  The eugenics movement was centralized 
under the German Society for Race Hygiene, and largely addressed the study of 
“family genealogies” to “safeguard the nation’s ‘genetic heritage’ and viewed 
degeneration as a threat.”37  Exactly what constituted this threat of racial 
contamination left ample room in later years for maneuver room under Nazi 
genocide. 
German racial hygiene reached new levels under the Weimar Republic.  
During this period, following the war and humiliating defeat, and amplified by the 
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political, economic, and social chaos of the interwar years, “large numbers of the 
professional classes embraced the racial ideology of radical German nationalism.  
They sympathized with the movements that called for a strong leader to 
command a community based on racial purity and strength…”38 
Furthermore, the professional proponents of racial hygiene and eugenics 
were far from the radical fringes.  They were, instead, highly-respected members 
of the medical community.  Indeed, a number of eugenics and racial hygiene 
research centers were established in Germany during the Weimar years.39  In 
fact, the entire early stages of the Nazi genocide, those of sterilization and later 
euthanasia, were utterly dependant upon the medical profession.  Without its 
willing cooperation and participation, these stages would not have been possible. 
Under the first stage of Nazi racial hygiene policies, the 1933 Law for the 
Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases (the so-called sterilization law) 
compulsory sterilization was introduced.  Under this law, “any person suffering 
from a hereditary disease can be sterilized if medical knowledge indicates that 
his offspring will suffer from severe hereditary physical or mental damage.”40  It 
further defines these hereditary diseases as: 
 1. congenital feeblemindedness 
 2. schizophrenia 
 3. manic-depressive psychosis 
 4. hereditary epilepsy 
 5. hereditary St. Vitus’s dance (Huntington’s chorea) 
 6. hereditary blindness 
 7. hereditary deafness 
 8. severe hereditary physical deformity 
 9. severe alcoholism41 
 
Under the sterilization law, application for sterilization could be made by 
the patient, or by physicians of public health services, or by directors of hospitals, 
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homes, and prisons.  Furthermore, if the application was approved by the court42, 
the sterilization could be carried out even against the will of the individual.  The 
police were empowered to use force if necessary.  The law took effect on 1 
January 1934.  Between 1934 and 1936, 259,051 applications for sterilization 
were made, 198,869 were approved, and 168,989 were actually carried out.  
Altogether, approximately 300,000 sterilizations took place before the war, and 
another 75,000 or so after the war began.43 
There are two significant points to bring out about the early sterilization 
program of the Nazis.44  First, the future victims of the genocide weren’t targets 
during these procedures, except as they fell into one specified categories of 
hereditary disease carriers. At this stage, the German nationalism sought to 
exclude any element that would weaken the German ‘genetic heritage”, whether 
foreign or not.  Second, the sterilization program was conducted overtly, with full 
public knowledge.  This was no so with the next step of euthanasia.  This was, 
for the most part, conducted in great secrecy, with steps to even hide it initially 
from the law. 
The first part of the euthanasia program was the killing of handicapped 
infants.  The Fuhrer authorized the planning of the infant euthanasia program at 
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the end of 1938.45  To keep the project as inconspicuous as possible, Hitler 
assigned it to his own Chancellery of the Fuhrer of the Nazi Party (KdF)46, an 
organization that was accountable only to him and placed Phillip Bouhler (head 
of KdF) and Karl Brandt (his personal physician) in charge of establishing the 
program.47  Between February and May of 1939, the men tasked with developing 
the euthanasia program worked out the methods for its implementation.  To 
maintain secrecy, they created the Reich Committee for the Scientific 
Registration of Severe Hereditary Ailments, known as the Reich Committee.  
This fictitious organization was just a front with a mailbox to cover the 
involvement of the KdF.  The Reich Committee was initially run by Viktor Brack, 
the head of Central Office II of the KdF, Hans Hefelmann, the chief of office IIb 
under Brack, and Richard von Hegener, Hefelmann’s deputy.  Additionally, the 
men met privately with Dr. Herbert Linden, of the Reich Ministry of the Interior 
(RMdI).  Linden was the director of the Section for State Hospitals and Nursing 
Homes, of Department IV (National Health) of the RMdI.  Although the project 
was run by the KdF for discretion, only the RMdI had the authority to issue 
enforceable directives, and so the cooperation of Department IV was essential.  
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Furthermore, Department IV was responsible for the eugenics policy and the 
enforcement of the sterilization law.48   
What made the cooperation of Department IV so essential was the 
dependence of the entire project on medical facilities, institutions, and personnel.  
The prior to the actual killings, the Reich Committee, through Department IV, 
issued a decree ordering all midwives and physicians to report all newborns and 
children up to the age of three with specified conditions: 
1. idiocy and mongolism 
2. microcephaly 
3. severe or progressive hydrocephalus 
4. all physical deformities 
5. paralysis49 
 
The decree provided a form that also required a brief description of the 
condition, chances of improvement, life expectancy, ability to function, and so 
forth.  Not much room was provided for details.  The forms were returned via the 
public health service to the Reich Committee, who reviewed them and 
determined, based solely on the information provided on the form, whether the 
child would live or die. 
Upon selection for euthanasia, the child was transferred a children’s ward 
established by the Reich Committee at one of several state hospitals for the 
actual killing.  The first was at Brandenburg-Gorden under the direction of Hans 
Heinze, one of the three medical experts on the Reich Committee who selected 
the children, and an avid proponent of euthanasia.  Over the next three years the 
Reich Committee established a total of twenty-two children’s killing wards.  The 
Reich Committee had to find directors who were willing to house the killing 
wards, and had to recruit the physicians willing to do the killing.  The directors 
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and physicians were recruited voluntarily; the few who refused to participate were 
excused without coercion or repercussions.50 
At no time was the true purpose of the transfers discussed or revealed to 
either the parents or the medical facilities transferring the children out.  Rather, 
the entire operation was disguised as being for the benefit of the patient to 
receive special care.  In announcing the first children’s ward at Brandenburg-
Gordon, the RMdI decree informed the public-health services that “under expert 
medical supervision the psychiatric children’s ward at Gordon near Brandenburg 
on the Havel will provide all available therapeutic interventions made possible by 
recent scientific discoveries.”51  The RMdI, under the guidance of the Reich 
Committee, even went so far as to have either the parents or the welfare system 
provide payment for the “therapeutic treatment” without revealing its true nature. 
At this stage, the method of killing was unspecified and varied widely from 
center to center.  Each killing was done on an individual basis, unlike the adult 
euthanasia systems that eventually led to the death camp killing systems.  For 
the children at this point, the method of killing was “left to the discretion of the 
physicians.”52  Although some institutions simply starved the children to death, 
most preferred the use of medication.  Additionally, the medications used were 
often just gradual overdoses of common hospital medications, rather than 
poisons, a method that did not cause outright death.  Instead, this method led to 
medical complications such as pneumonia.  Thus the hospital could then, rightly, 
report the cause of death as “natural causes”, thus avoiding arousing suspicion.  
Of course, this argument did not hold up in post-war military tribunals, but by then 
it was too late.53  Regardless of the method used to kill the handicapped children, 
each death was undertaken individually, rather then through systemic process.  
That development would take form with the murder of handicapped adults. 
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It is critical to reiterate at this point that the killing of the handicapped 
children was not a genocidal practice; if the victims were Jewish it was only 
coincidental to being handicapped.  However, the children were killed for reasons 
of racial purity, which is only one very small step away from initiating genocide, 
and in this case was a precursor step to subsequent genocide.  For these 
victims, “the children were killed because they did not fit into the projected future 
German society.”54  The essential elements, however, are similar to that of 
genocide: intentional killing of a perceived weakness to the race, for the purpose 
of promoting the superiority of the race.  For the children, the reason for the 
perceived threat to the genetic heritage of the race was a belief in their individual 
genetic weakness due to some physical or mental deformity.  This is only a small 
step away from the perception of an entire group being inferior, and therefore a 
genetic threat.  For the Nazis, of course, this group was the Jews. 
Another absolutely critical point to highlight is that the euthanasia of the 
children did not involve either the cooperation, or even the consent, of the 
society.  It was without a doubt the work of a relatively few individuals.  The 
extreme efforts to conceal the program from all elements of the society, including 
most parts of the bureaucracy itself, are clear indicators that the Nazi leadership 
felt that society would disapprove of the program.  Indeed, many parents of 
euthanasia victims had to be coerced into admitting their children into the 
children’s wards even with the fabrication of advanced medical care and without 
any knowledge of the child’s imminent murder.  The euthanasia grew out of the 
eugenics science that had some international following to it.  Basically, there is 
absolutely no way that the blame for the euthanasia can in any way be placed 
upon the German people. It rests squarely upon the Nazi leadership, and the 
select individuals in the medical profession that perpetrated this crime.  All told, 
some 5,000 children were murdered in the Reich Committee’s children’s wards. 
                                                 
54 Friedlander, p. 58. 
 34
At the same time that the Reich Committee’s killing operation of children 
was happening, a parallel, closely related operation was underway to kill 
handicapped adults within the Reich.  This operation, however, was for a 
different purpose.  The killing of the handicapped children was to eliminate future 
weakening of the German genetic heritage; in other words, to kill them before 
they could reproduce although the rationale to justify the killings was to mercifully 
spare them from a life of pain and suffering that they would be unable to adjust to 
anyway.  The neither of these arguments, either the eugenics argument of 
protecting the heritage, or the Samaritan argument of mercy-killing, holds up 
against the killing of the handicapped adults.  In the first place, they had already 
been sterilized for the most part under the 1933 sterilization law, so they could no 
longer threaten the genetic heritage anyway.  And as adults they had already 
demonstrated the ability to adjust to living their lives, so the mercy argument fails 
to hold either.  The reason for their deaths, according to Friedlander, was a purge 
of the race: 
Although the murder of handicapped adults was both unnecessary 
and senseless because they were already sterilized and thus 
unable to produce descendants, for the killers a logical progression 
led from exclusion to extermination.  First, the regime had 
implemented compulsory sterilization to inhibit the birth of 
potentially unfit infants.  Second, it had introduced euthanasia for 
children to eliminate any such infant not prevented by the 
sterilization program.  Third, having assured the future, it proposed 
to cleanse the present and erase the past by launching euthanasia 
for the adults.55 
As early as 1935 Hitler had said he would introduce compulsory 
euthanasia when war came.  In the summer of 1939 Hitler gave the assignment 
to prepare for the killing operations to Bouhler and Brandt, the men he had 
already tasked with creating the children’s euthanasia program, who in turn 
assigned it to Vicktor Brack and his Department II of the KdF, thus placing both 
euthanasia programs under one control.  However, due to the population size of 
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the victims, the small KdF staff was insufficient for the scope of the task.  A new 
front organization was created, with offices at Tiergarten Strasse Number 4, 
giving the operation it’s code-name: Operation T4.56 
The scope of the project also required the recruitment of far more staff and 
physician s that the children’s program, and under existing German penal Code 
articles 211 and 212 “[k]illing a human being, except enemy soldiers in battle or 
criminals legally convicted by a court, continued to be a crime in Nazi 
Germany…”57 Thus T4 had to assure its potential physicians that they would not 
be prosecuted for participating in T4.  To that end Brandt and Bouhler succeeded 
in getting written authorization from Hitler in October 1939, pre-dated to 1 
September 1939.58  With such written authorization, Brack had little difficulty in 
recruiting personnel, largely through personal contacts and party connections: 
“No one was forced to participate; all joined voluntarily.”59 
With the onset of T4 Operations, the killing began to develop the 
techniques that would become standard in Operations Reinhard in the east.  Like 
the children’s euthanasia, the first step in the process involved issuing 
questionnaires through the RMdI.  First the local governments were required to 
provide information on the number of state hospitals, old-age homes, and 
sanatoriums.  Then the RMdI, once again through Linden’s office, approached 
the institutions individually with questionnaires about the facilities, staff, number 
of patients, number of criminals, number of Jews, and proximity to transportation, 
all with an eye toward systematic development of the killings.  The RMdI also 
sent questionnaires to be filled out about the individual patients, including name, 
age, citizenship, race, time at the institution, guardian, payment information, 
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whether relatives visited on a regular basis, and whether the patient was 
criminally insane.  A small block asked for a diagnosis, and another small block 
asked about the type of work the patient could do.60 
These questionnaires were required for all patients in one of a number of 
specified medical categories, but also for patients who were “without German 
citizenship” and “not of Germanic or related blood.”61  These last two, combined 
with the types of questions asked on the surveys about relatives, payments, race, 
and ability to work, can be seen as the first direct steps toward genocide.  The 
actions up to this point, sterilization of the handicapped and euthanasia of 
handicapped children, were murder but without genocidal undertones.  The killing 
now shifted away from killing on specific individuals to classifying individuals as 
parts of groups to determine their status in the killing program.  However, the 
killings have not yet become part of the genocide; Jews are not yet being killed 
as a group, but the building blocks for the Jewish genocide fell into place with the 
adult program.62 
Based on the questionnaires provided, a panel of T4 physicians scanned 
the forms and indicated life or death, and the killing system took over the fate of 
the victims in such a way as to “assure the killing systems would have neither to 
many nor too few victims at any one time; only a consistent and constant flow of 
patients could guarantee a cost- and labor-effective killing operation.”63 
T4 notified the “surrendering institution” a few days before transport, 
through Linden’s RMdI department, that on a certain date Gekrat64 would pick up 
a specific number of patients.  Notice that as late as few days prior to transport, 
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the institution only has numbers, not names.   As we shall see shortly, Gekrat 
wasn’t concerned as much with who was transported as it was concerned with 
how many were transported, another step closer to the impersonal killing system 
of the genocide.  Two days before pickup the institution receive d the list of 
names for transport, and a day before pickup a Gekrat representative arrived to 
finalize the transportation details.  At this point, the hospital sometimes was able 
to negotiate with the representative to have a particular patient’s name removed 
from the transportation list, particularly if that patient was an able-bodied worker 
need by the institution.  However, the numbers had to match and so another 
patient had to be substituted, thus demonstrating that at this point killing one 
handicapped adult was as good as another, without real concern for the 
individual handicap.  The next day, the infamous grey Gekrat buses arrived, and 
the patients were loaded on with their personal belongings, all personal and 
medical records, and all valuables, which were recorded on separate forms.  All 
this was done in great secrecy, obviously.  The surrendering institutions were 
ordered not to notify relatives prior to the transfer, nor to inform whoever was 
paying for the patient (relatives, welfare agencies, etc.).  Only after the patient 
was transferred, and killed, did T4 begin the false notification process.  The 
surrendering institutions sent a form letter (received from Gekrat) informing the 
relatives that the patient had been transferred at the orders of the Reich defense 
commissar, that the receiving institution would contact them, and that the 
surrendering institution had no further information to provide.  The killing center 
sent a letter a few days later informing the relative that the patient had been 
received, but that visits were prohibited for the time being.  Shortly thereafter, the 
relatives received a letter hat the patient had died, and due to an epidemic the 
body had already been cremated.65 
Throughout the Reich, six killing centers were created in 1940.  The first 
was established at a vacant prison in Brandenburg on the Havel.  The rest were 
created from existing medical facilities. Depending on the particular center, the 
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gas chambers could hold between twenty-five and seventy-five people at once. 
The chambers were modified from an existing room in the buildings to resemble 
a shower room, with tiles, benches along the walls, and fake showerheads.  The 
doors and windows had been modified to provide an airtight seal.  The gas was 
piped into the chambers through one-inch pipes along the floors with holes in 
them for the gas.  The gas was bottled carbon monoxide located in an adjacent 
room.66 
Upon arriving at the killing centers, the patients underwent a process that 
has become tragically familiar to history, on a much larger scale in the east.  First 
the victims were met by a nurse and brought into a reception room.  There they 
were made to undress, and their belongings were sorted and numbered.  Next 
they went one at a time in to see a physician.  This helped to pacify the victims 
by maintaining the illusion of being a medical facility.  The actual purpose of the 
physician was to make a cursory assessment of the patient to determine a 
fraudulent cause of death for the death certificate.  The physicians also marked 
those patients’ bodies that had gold dental work, for removal after death.  The 
next step was usually a photograph of the victim, and then when the entire 
transport was completed with this “reception process” they were assembled and 
led into the gas chambers.  After ten minutes, the gas was shut off, and the 
chamber remained sealed for one to two hours afterwards.  After that time, the 
chamber was vented.  Facility staff “stokers” then removed the bodies and piled 
them in an adjacent room for various medical purposes, such as autopsies and 
organ removal for scientific study.  Also the gold dental works was removed. 
Finally the stokers cremated the bodies.  The ashes went randomly into urns in 
case any relatives requested the remains, as per the death notifications.67 
The use of gas as a killing agent was not a unique aspect of the 
euthanasia program; it had been used in Poland already.  A test gas chamber 
was constructed at Fort VII at Poznan, and in November and December 1939, 
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some 595 Polish mentally handicapped patients were gassed.  Both carbon 
monoxide and an agent similar to Zyklon B were tested.  Carbon monoxide was 
found to be more effective.  Fort VII was not suitably located to transportation 
lines, however, which created secrecy problems for transporting patients in, and 
corpses out.  For these reasons, Herbert Lange’s infamous commando began 
using specially-modified killing vans, where-by the gas was diverted into a sealed 
chamber on the back of the truck to kill its victims.  This way, Lange’s commando 
was able to “bring the gas chamber and bottled carbon monoxide to the victims” 
instead of bringing the victims to the gas.68  What made the T4 operations so 
significant to the progress toward genocide was the systemic way it which it 
“processed” its victims. 
On 24 August 1941 Hitler ordered the stop of the adult euthanasia 
program in the T4 killing centers.  He did not, however, order the end to the 
actual killing of the handicapped adults.  In spite of its massive attempts at 
secrecy, the public was beginning to become aware of the operation.  Occasional 
mistakes and inconsistencies in the fabricated deaths occurred, and at the 
original Brandenburg killing center, the smell of burning flesh from the 
crematorium had so permeated the city that T4 had to close it in September 
1940.  Euthanasia continued after the stop order, but it entered into its “wild” 
phase, where victims were killed locally be far less systematic methods, ranging 
from starvations to medication overdoses.  Slightly more than 70,000 mentally 
handicapped victims died in the killing centers.  Concurrent with the killing of the 
handicapped was the expulsion of the Jews from Germany, an act 
unquestionably genocidal. Eventually the two programs, Jewish expulsion and 
systematic killing would come together in the form of the extermination camps.  
 
B. THE EXPULSION POLICIES 
The sterilization and euthanasia programs formed the origins of what 
would become the extermination camp systems, but at the beginning these 
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programs were not part the Jewish genocide.  As discussed, the victims of these 
programs were largely German, and the Jews were victims only if they fell into 
one of the categories specified by the programs.  This would change later, and 
Jews would become victims of T4, and later Operation Reinhard, solely by being 
Jewish.  These will be discussed later. 
At the same time as the sterilization and euthanasia, however, the Jews 
were falling victim to the genocidal act of expulsion.  Throughout 1939 and 1941 
they were forced out of their homes and cities, and relocated the east.  Those 
who would argue that there is a qualitative difference between genocide and 
ethnic cleansing would argue that this was not a genocide, but “only” ethnic 
cleansing.  During this period, the Nazis did not seek to kill all the Jews, but 
merely to remove their presence from the Reich. 
As argued in Chapter I, however, this author sees no real distinction 
between the two, and sees the expulsion acts to be just as genocidal as the later 
extermination camps.  The point of the expulsions was to rid the Reich, including 
its territorial acquisitions, entirely of both the Jews and of any and all Jewish 
influence.  This is, quite clearly, what Lemkin meant when he wrote about 
genocide. 
Even before the start of the war, the goal of the Nazis was to drive all the 
Jews out of Germany, to make Germany judenfrei.  Their earliest methods were 
to induce the Jews into leaving voluntarily, through the enactment such as the 
Haavara Agreement of August, 1933.  Under this agreement, between the Nazi 
government, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, and the German Zionist Union, Jews 
were permitted to emigrate to Palestine without restriction, but had to leave half 
their property to the German State.  Some 60,000 Jews took advantage of this 
program.69 
In 1935 the regime took more steps with the enactment of the Nuremburg 
Laws.  These laws had two purposes.  First, it specifically defined who was a 
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Jew, based upon the Nazis vague racial science.  Second, it deprived the Jews 
of their legal status, including their German citizenship, and made “marriages and 
sexual relations between Jews and Germans” illegal.70  Gradually more 
restrictions were emplaced “with the intention of forcing them to leave the 
country.”71  Prohibitions were placed upon the Jews that forbade them from 
practicing certain professions, such as medicine and law.  Their property rights 
were gradually reduced, and eventually, as in the example of the Berlin Jews, 
they were required to declare all property and transfer it to either the State or to 
Aryan ownership.72  All these practices were intended to make life for the Jew in 
Germany so unbearable he would leave of his own accord. 
Besides this legal avenue of denying the Jews their civil rights and legal 
status was a campaign of indiscriminate violence, although at this point is was 
uncontrolled hooliganism for the most part, rather than systemic and coordinated.  
The most famous outburst of violence against the Jews, of course, was 
Kristallnacht in November 1938.  As both Naimark and Browning point out, this 
uncontrolled violence and destruction was not appreciated by the German 
population, and threatened to get out of control.73  Even after all of these 
measures, many Jews remained in Germany, hoping that the situation would 
improve and that things would get better.74 
Even during the early years of the war the Nazis permitted, and even 
encouraged, the emigration of German Jews, because “the short term priority of 
the Nazi regime was to make the Third Reich the first territory in Europe to be 
free of Jews.”75  As the war progressed and more territory fell under Nazi 
influence and control, the Nazis enacted measures to limit the emigration of Jews 
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from other countries.  This was for the purpose of allowing German Jews to take 
advantage of the few options still open to Jews, such as continued immigration 
into Palestine.  The Foreign Office assisted in negotiating a treaty with Italy 
before the latter’s entry into the war, which allowed German Jews access to 
Trieste to transit to Palestine.  After May 1940, when Italy refused further entry to 
German Jews, the German Foreign Office assisted in expediting the paperwork 
of German Jews to transit through the Soviet Union and Manchuko to Shanghai, 
until Operation Barbarossa closed this route too.  German Jews were permitted 
to emigrate from German until as late as October, 1941, more than two years 
after the start of the war.76 
According to Browning, the conquest of Poland in 1939 placed an 
additional 2 million Jews under the Nazis and completely changed the Jewish 
question.  Prior to the war, the Nazis sough to rid Germany of its Jews through 
emigration; now the vast numbers involved made more drastic solutions 
necessary for the Jews outside the Old Reich.77  To this end, once Germany 
conquered Poland, it began to relocate the Polish Jews with the ultimate aim of 
expulsion from all Reich territories, although for the time being it left the Jews in 
the Old Reich and Austria alone. 
This relocation program in preparation for expulsion created the Polish 
ghettos.  These ghettos were created with the intention of only providing 
intermediate locations for the Polish Jews.  The plans for their final destination 
varied wildly from the Soviet Union to Madagascar. 78  To this end, the Polish 
ghettos arose far more as a result of local measures to prepare for future 
movements than as a result of any grand plan for the Jews.  In any event, these 
vast expulsions never occurred.  From September 1939 to April 1941, only 
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approximately 63,000 Polish Jews were actually deported.79  Exactly what the 
function of the ghettos was and how the Jews were to be treated in the ghettos 
was disputed among the Nazis.  Some viewed the ghettos as a means to attrit 
the Jews through starvation; others viewed the ghettos as a means to contain 
them while still making them productive to the German war effort.80   In any 
event, intentional or not there was not enough food supplies available in the 
ghettos.  Browning asserts that “the whole point of the ghetto was to force the 
Jews to disgorge their ‘hoarded wealth’ in exchange for food.”81 
By the end of 1940, the Polish ghettos had become permanent fixtures.  
At this point, two plans for forced mass expulsions came to the fore.  By now the 
Nazis had effective control over approximately four million Jews in all its captured 
territories and the Reich.  One proposal was the re-emergence of the 
Madagascar Plan, in which all the Jews would be shipped off to Madagascar 
after the expected defeat of the British.  The other proposal was to force the 
Jews even further east over the Urals after the expected defeat of the Soviets.  
An additional plan envisioned that the defeat of the Soviet Union would cause 
Great Britain to “lose heart and sue for peace; the western Jews, including those 
in North Africa, could then be shipped off to Madagascar.”82 
 
C. KILLING THE JEWS 
The Polish campaign brought about the first killings of the Jews.  The war 
in Poland was marked by the mass shootings of large civilian populations, but 
“whenever large numbers of people had been shot, Jews had always been shot 
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in disproportionate numbers.”83  However, it does not appear that there were 
explicit orders to murder the Jews en masse.  During September of 1939 many 
Jews were murdered, often by regular troops.  At one point, the murder of Jews 
had become so common that the commander of 10th Army inquired from his 
superior, Rundstedt, if the army had issued orders to shoot civilian prisoners.  
Rundstedt replied in the negative.84  However, Himmler had ordered the 
Einsatzgruppen to “shoot all insurgents, loosely defined as anyone who 
endangered German life or property.”85  To this end mass executions of all 
classes of Poles occurred: intelligentsia, Catholic Priests, Jews, and Gypsies.  In 
sum, from the start of the war until 25 October 1939, some 16,336 executions 
were carried out in Poland. 86  This was paltry compared to the numbers of 
victims from Operation Barbarossa. 
Prior to the actual invasion in June, Hitler issued an order on 3 March 
1941 considered by historians as the signal to unleash total destruction against 
the Soviet Jews.  He stated that “the Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia must be 
eliminated.”87  Naimark asserts that “[I]n the Nazi mind, the internationalism of 
the Bolsheviks blended with the Jewish world conspiracy in a dangerous portion 
that mortally threatened the German nation and its right to rule Europe.”88  This 
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to participate” in hostile acts, and exempted soldiers from punishment for acts committed “out of 
bitterness against …subversive carriers of the Jewish-Bolshevik system.”  Taken together, these 
decrees set the foundation for free, unconstrained killing at will.  See Alexander Dallin, German 
rule in Russia, 1941-1945, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), p. 30-34, and Theo Schulte, 
The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia, (Oxford: St. Martin’s Press, 1898), p. 
215. 
88 Naimark, p. 75. 
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ties back into the ideas discussed in Chapter I about the exclusionary nationalism 
prevalent in the interwar years in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Yet even with Hitler’s statement in March, the actual transition to 
deliberate mass execution of the Soviet Jews had a fitful start.  Browning argues 
that tactical commanders of SD, police, Einsatzgruppen, and Wehrmacht units 
began the killings as early as 24 June 1941, and only after the fact did Himmler 
and Heydrich sanction these shootings.89  Over the next several weeks the 
shootings became larger and more commonplace, and included more women 
and children.  By the end of July, more than 63,000 victims had been shot by the 
Einsatzgruppen, and more than 90% of them were Jews.90 
The killing of the Jews had, by this point, become standardized, although it 
still involved shootings.  The killers brought their victims in groups to remote 
killing sites, where the first group had been made to dig a mass grave.  The 
victims were forced to strip, and then were either shot on the edge of the pit or 
were forced to lie on top of previous victims and were murdered in the pit.  It was 
a bloodbath, and became “execution tourism” for on-looking Germans.91 
With the mass executions that included Jewish women and children, “the 
crucial step to systematic mass murder had been taken.”92  Sometime in the late 
summer or early fall of 1941, Hitler apparently gave Goring the authorization to 
have Heydrich begin planning the total annihilation of all European Jews.  The 
Polish ghettos, originally intended to be waypoints along the route to expulsion, 
had become permanent and a new solution was needed, one that would also 
address German Jews within the Reich.  But the experiences of the Soviet 
Jewish executions demonstrated some serious difficulties for the Nazis.  First 
was that the mass killings by firing squad required considerable manpower.  
Second was the obvious mental strain the on the firing squad.  And third was that 
                                                 
89 Browning, p. 253-255. 
90 Browning, p. 260. 
91 Browning, p. 261. 
92 Browning, p. 352. 
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the executions did not remain secret for long.  Too many soldiers knew about 
them, and took pictures and wrote home about it.  While this was not a problem 
in the far-off Soviet front, it would create serious difficulties in the rest of Europe.  
The Nazis needed a more efficient, detached, and secret method to kill the rest 
of the European Jews.93 
The solution, of course, was the gas chamber method that was originally 
developed for the euthanasia program.  Besides the specified handicapped 
victims, it had already been used to a limited extent for the mass murder of 
Jewish patients.  Sometime in March or April of 1940the decision to kill Jewish 
handicapped patients still in German hospitals, regardless of their specific 
medical or psychological condition.  In April of 1940, Linden of the RMdI 
requested all local authorities to report the total numbers of Jewish patients in 
their hospitals.  The first transports began moving their victims to the killing 
centers in late June1940.  The procedures were the same: the RMdI directed that 
Jewish patients be transferred to a small number of institutions, which served as 
assembly centers.  Gekrat then informed the assembly centers that on a 
particular day it would pick up a certain number of patients, after which they were 
taken to one of the killing centers and killed the same day.  Unlike the German 
victims, the relatives of the Jewish victims received only the briefest notification 
of the transfer of their relatives.  Initially the notifications said that destination was 
unknown.  However, in order to continue to receive payments for its victims long 
after their deaths, T4 developed the charade that they had been transferred to 
Chelm, in the Government General. An elaborate system developed whereby a 
T4 functionary even traveled the Chelm to mail responses to German Jewish 
relatives’ inquiries, so the postmark would be correct.  By December 1940, most 
Jewish patients in German hospital were dead.  The remainder would become 
victims of the transports of German and Austrian Jews that began in October 
1941.94 
                                                 
93 Browning, p. 353-354. 
94 Friedlander, p. 272-282. 
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With the model of the euthanasia centers, the massive numbers of Jews in 
the Polish ghettos and also still inside the Reich, and the difficulties experienced 
by the Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union in terms of manpower, stress, and 
secrecy, the creation of the Nazi extermination camps was a logical evolution.  
As T4 had discovered, it was far more efficient and easier to bring to victims to 
the killers than to kill the victims were they were.  The first killing center was at 
Chelm, in Poland, and began operating in December 1941.  Initially this center 
employed large van that recycled their own carbon monoxide to kill.   Only in 
1942 did the next camps (Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, Majdanek, and Auschwitz) 
use gas chambers.  And only Auschwitz and Majdanek used Zyklon B, the rest 
used carbon monoxide.95 
As this chapter has hopefully shown, the genocide of the Jews by using 
the extermination centers of the east was a process that evolved gradually, 
through the crucible of war.  It was not a plan that sprang fully-formed from the 
minds of its authors, but developed off of other programs, admittedly just as 
horrific.  And these programs nonetheless came about through experimentation, 
with trial and error.  Although one cannot (and should not) argue that the initial 
pre-war eugenics movement and sterilization led directly to the death camps, one 
can see that events and ideas built upon each other.  Even without the eugenics 
and euthanasia, the Jews would have been victims of mass murder, as was the 
case of the Soviet Jews murdered by firing squads.  Yet it is equally possible that 
without the model of the euthanasia centers the Jews in Poland, well away from 
the brutalities of the war on the eastern front, might not have been murdered on a 
massive scale precisely because they were in an area in which large-scale killing 
had already ceased.  Among the reasons for the creation of the death camps 
was the need to spare the killers from the stress of the killings, and to keep the 
killings secret from the German homefront.  It is possible these challenges would 
have been insurmountable in an environment of 1941 Poland, behind the fighting 
lines. 
                                                 
95 Friedlander, p. 286-287. 
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Thus the roots of the Final Solution, in its ultimate execution, did not have 
any grand plan.  It rose out of the sterilization and eugenics programs that 
attempted to purify the German race from within.  While this internal purge was 
underway against the weak elements of the German race, the Jews were being 
driven out of Germany by terror, and form Poland by force.  Finally, the invasion 
of the Soviet Union targeted Jews for the nothing less than execution.  It also 
demonstrated to the Nazi leadership that they could not physically shoot every 
single Jew, and the turned back to their internal methods of purging for the 
answer, leading to the element of mass murder in their genocide of the Jews. 
Forty-seven years later, genocide reappeared in Europe in Bosnia.  Like 
the Nazis, the Serbs attempted racial restructuring, although on a much smaller 
scale.  Like the Nazis, they used terror tactics to coerce the Bosniacs to flee.  
Those who remained were forcible driven out, if not murdered outright.  Many 
were incarcerated in concentration camps that rivaled the brutality of the Nazi 
concentration camps.  While the Nazis introduced systematic extermination into 
their genocide of the Jews, the Serb introduced another weapon of genocide, 
that of systematic rape.  This and other methods of Serb genocide are addressed 
in Chapter IV. 
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IV. THE BALKAN WARS, 1991-1995 
A. THE ORIGINS OF MODERN NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS 
Genocide is the ultimate expression of integral nationalism, and this is 
abundantly true in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  From 1991 
to 1995 Europe witnessed the worst atrocities on the continent in forty-five years.  
Hundreds of thousands of civilians were forced out of their homes, tens of 
thousands were brutalized, tortured, and raped, and thousands were murdered.  
All this was done in the name of “ethnic cleansing.”96 
Although all three groups involved, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims 
(or Bosniacs)97, committed atrocities and ethnic cleansing, the worst offenders by 
far were the Serbs, although the Croats weren’t significantly better.  The 
Bosniacs also committed their share of atrocities but unlike the Serbs and Croat, 
their crimes were not committed in the name of ethnic cleansing, but were 
“merely” the savageries of war. 
The Balkans wars brought two debates to the fore.  The first was whether 
or not the crimes were committed because of age-old ethnic hatreds based on 
the belief that the South Slavs always had been killing each other and would 
always continue to do so.  The second, and far more controversial, debate was 
whether or not the Bosnian Muslims were the victims of genocide, or if ethnic 
cleansing was less than genocide. 
In answer to these two debates, this chapter answers the first with the 
response that the wars were not the continuation of centuries-old hatreds, but 
were a continuation of World War Two hatreds.  The response to the second 
debate is that the ethnic cleansing was a genocide.  This is admittedly a minority 
opinion today, but that doesn’t make it wrong; only uncomfortable for decision-
makers. 
                                                 
96 This chapter will only address the Balkans civil war of 1991-1995 which ended with the 
Dayton Peace Accords.  The second act of this tragedy was played out in Kosovo in 1999, but will 
not be discussed here. 
97 “Bosniac” is synonymous with “Bosnian Muslim”. 
 50
It is necessary first to clarify some of the groups involved for those who 
might not be versed in modern Balkans history.  The Serbs who committed the 
genocide of the Bosniacs are usually referred to as “Bosnian Serbs”.  These are 
Serbs who live in Bosnia, and technically represent the group responsible.  The 
Bosnian Serbs established the Republika Srbska within Bonsia and Hercergovina 
after Bosnia declared its independence, under the leadership of Radovan 
Karadzic.  Slobodan Milosevic was the President of “rump Yugoslavia” which 
included only Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo.  “Serbia” itself was 
not legally a belligerent to the conflict, although it certainly provided illegal 
weapons, soldiers, and officers.  The JNA was essentially a Serbian army, and 
participated in the fighting in Bosnia and Croatia.  The ICTY has yet to prove that 
Milosevic was directing and controlling Karadzic, although it seems likely.  Thus 
when we refer to “the Serbs” in reference to the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia, we 
are referring to the Serb nation, rather than the Republic of Serbia of the Former 
Yugoslavia.  Also, although the primary victims of the genocide in Bosnia were 
the Bosniacs, or Bosnian Muslims, all non-Serbs in the areas claimed by the 
Serbs suffered similar fates.  In particular, this meant the Bosnian Croats (Croats 
living in Bosnia).  At times, however, the Serbs and Croats cooperated with each 
other against the Bosniacs, and later the Bosniacs and Croats joined to form the 
Muslim-Croat Federation, one of the two Entities in present-day Bosnia and 
Hercegovia.  There do not appear to be any instances where the Bosniacs and 
Serbs cooperated against the Croats, although at times the front line forces 
occasionally established certain informal cease-fires and the like. 
In contrast to the Nazi genocide of the Jews, the Serbian genocide against 
the Bosnians was sporadic, wild, and significantly less centralized.  Like the 
Nazis, the intent of the Serbs was not to necessarily kill every single Bosnian 
Muslim, but to destroy their presence, to include any legacy of them, in a 
particular territory.  Recall that the Nazis were perfectly content to encourage 
voluntary emigration of the Jews.  And they had not particular desire to kill every 
Jew, only to remove their presence from all territory under their control.  The 
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systematic approach of the Nazis came about because of the sheer numbers 
they were dealing with, and therefore of the most significant differences between 
the Nazis and the Serbs was not qualitative, but quantitative; it’s a difference of 
scale, not scope. 
 
B. NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS 
One of the popular myths, now largely discredited in academic circles but 
still held popularly, is that the national identities and hatreds among the peoples 
is centuries-old.  Many point to the myth of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo as a 
watershed of Serbian nationalism.  This is a mistake to consider Kosovo of such 
real significance, but when one considers integral nationalism, reality may not 
necessarily be all that important. 
In one work on nationalism, written in 1955, Boyd Shafer points out that 
nationalism is based upon certain beliefs and conditions, among which is a belief 
in a common history, which can be invented.98 Renan put it in simpler terms: 
“Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.”99 To this end, while the notion 
that the Battle of Kosovo was a turning-point in Serb nationalism is false, the idea 
that in 1989 Milosevic made the myth of the Battle of Kosovo into a symbol of 
Serb nationalism is more correct. 
Certainly, one cannot accurately state that the people of the Balkans killed 
each other in the 1990s because they’ve always been killing each other.  But at 
the same time, one cannot deny that the 1912-1913 Balkans Wars involved 
exactly the same genocidal actions as those that ended the century. 
The reader who has…followed…the chain of…events studied and 
described by the Commission, has doubtless discovered the 
common feature which unites the Balkans nations, though it is 
necessary to discover that war is waged not only by the armies but 
by the nations themselves. The local population is divided into as 
                                                 
98 Boyd Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 
1955), p. 6. 
99 Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1996) p. 41. 
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many fragmentary parts as it contains nationalities, and these fight 
each together, each being desirous to substitute itself for other.  
This is why these wars are so sanguinary, why they produce so 
great a loss in men, and end in the annihilation of the population 
and the ruins of whole regions…The populations mutually 
slaughtered and pursued with a ferocity heightened by mutual 
knowledge and the old hatreds and resentments they cherished. 
The first consequence of this fact is, that the object of these armed 
conflicts, overt or covert, clearly conceived or vaguely felt, but 
always and everywhere the same, was the complete extermination 
of an alien population.  In some cases this object expressed itself in 
the form of an implacable and categorical “order” – to kill the whole 
male population of the occupied regions. 100 
Like the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the interwar 
years, Yugoslavia had a similar origin of being formed from the ashes of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire through the Kulturnation of a people forming a state.  
And like these other countries, as discussed in Chapter II, a person either was or 
was not a member of the nation, and this fact could not change.  Thus a person 
was a Serb, a Croat, or a Bosniac, without regard for where he lived.101 
Much like the pre-WWII Germans (and most others in Central and Eastern 
Europe), the Serb political and intellectual leadership at the end of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century desired state borders that directly matched national 
boundaries, in the form of a Greater Serbia.  The borders they desired would be 
dictated racially; wherever Serbs lived, so the borders of Serbia must fall.  This 
Serbian nationalism contributed, of course, to the spark that ignited the First 
                                                 
100, The International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan 
Wars, The Other Balkan Wars (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1993) p. 148.  This is a republication of the Carnegie Endowment’s original 1913 Report 
of the International Commission To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, with 
a new forward by George F. Kennan concerning the 1990’s Balkans Wars. 
101 Similar to the Nazis classification of Jews as a race even though Judaism is a religion, the 
ethnic identities of the three peoples of Yugoslavia are religious in origin.  Croats are Catholics, 
Serbs are Orthodox, and Bosniacs are Muslims.  These identities go back centuries, and are a 
reflection of the Balkans’ location as the crossroads of the three major religions.  Racially, all 
three people are identically Slavic, which is not so in the case of the Albanians, who have a 
different ethnic origin. 
 53
World War, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.102  Even before this, 
however, Serbs recognized they would have to deal with minorities, as Naimark 
explains: “…in expanding its borders and including Serbs in a single state, Serbia 
would inevitably have to confront the presence of Croats and Muslims in Bosnia.  
The latter were slated in most Serb (and Croat) national programs for forced 
assimilation.”103 
With the onset of World War Two, the issue of nations and nationalism 
reached genocidal levels in the Balkans.  Strangely, the worst persecutions were 
committed by the Croat Ustasha, the ultra-nationalist movement that was given 
control of the newly-independent Croatia.104  The Croatian constitution “defined 
Croatians as a distinct race,” as within a short time the Ustasha military units 
began its campaign of genocide against the Serbs.  Possibly as many as 
250,000 Serbs were murdered by the Ustashi in mass executions, and countless 
thousands more were expelled from Croatia or forcibly converted to Catholicism.  
While the Ustashi were waging their genocidal war against the Serbs within 
Croatia, the nationalist Serb Chetniks were retaliating against Croats, and 
Muslims, outside.  At the same time Tito’s Communist Partisans were engaged in 
fighting the Chetniks, the Ustashi, and the Nazis, which even included Muslim 
Waffen SS units recruited from Bosnia.  The overall chaos of Yugoslavia is best 
described as “three distinct civil wars and one international conflict, waged both 
consecutively and simultaneously…”105 
                                                 
102 Do not confuse this “spark” with the causes for WWI; Serbian nationalism was one local 
issue but can hardly be said to have caused the war.  For example, see James Joll, The Origins 
of the First World War, Second Edition (Harlow, England: Pearson Education, LTD) 1992. 
103 Naimark, p. 144. 
104 The Ustasha movement (plural “Ustashi”) first formed in 1929 under Ante Pavelic in 
response to King Alexander’s military dictatorship of Yugoslavia.  The goal of the Ustashi was an 
independent Croatia based on a “Catholic identity”.  The Ustashi advanced a racial theory of 
being western Goths, rather than eastern Slavs like the Serbs, although it was accepted that both 
Serbs and Muslims could convert to Catholicism and become Croats.  After the invasion of 
Yugoslavia in 1941, Hitler broke up the country and placed Pavelic, who was in exile in Italy at the 
time, in charge of a separate Croatia.  Serbia, however, occupied by the Germans instead.  
Payne, p. 404-407. 
105 Payne, p. 407-410. 
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Unlike the Nazi racial definitions that specified Jewishness, one aspect 
worth noting about the Ustashi is that one could convert to Catholicism and thus 
no longer be persecuted.  The Nazis, on the other hand, had specific racial 
guidelines that were not surmountable by religious conversion, even though 
Judaism itself is a religion.  This same idea of conversion is equally present in 
the national programs of the Serbs. 
While the myth exists that the 1990s conflicts in Yugoslavia had their 
origins in centuries-old hatreds, the more truthful is that “[t]he bloody struggles 
that have attended the breakup of Yugoslavia since 1991 had the origins partly in 
the many-sided conflicts during World War II.”106 
 
C. GENOCIDE IN THE BALKANS 
The first actions of the Yugoslav War were, by the standards of the 
following year, extraordinarily peaceful and mundane.  When the Slovenes 
declared their independence on 25 June 1991, the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (the 
JNA107) immediately moved to “control the international border”.  After a brief ten-
day fight with few casualties108 and apparently no atrocities committed, the JNA 
quit Slovenia.  The reasons for this relatively bloodless conflict were that few 
Serbs actually lived in Slovenia, and the two republics did not share a common 
border.109  Also, in January 1991 Milosevic met with Slovene President Milan 
Kucan, during which a tacit understanding was reached that would allow 
Slovenia to secede so long as it “did not oppose Serbia’s plans for the rest of the 
country.”110 
                                                 
106 Payne, p. 409. 
107 The JNA had become Serb-dominated by this point, as more and more non-Serbs 
streamed away in the months preceding the declarations of independence.  The Yugoslav 
government was apparently content o let them go.  Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and 
Destruction of Yugoslavia, Second Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) p. 179. 
108 Forty-one JNA soldiers plus a “handful” of Slovenes.  Judah, p. 178. 
109 Naimark, p. 156. 
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The situation was different with Croatia, however, which also declared its 
independence on 25 June 1991.  Here the violence and atrocities that came to 
personify the war in Bosnia the following year had their immediate origins.  The 
first ethnic cleansing operation took place at the village of Kijevo, in the Krajina 
area of Croatia.  The Serb paramilitary forces expelled the Croat inhabitants by 
force and destroyed the village.111  The purpose of this operation, like so many 
others to follow, was to drive out the non-Serbs from those areas of Croatia, and 
later Bosnia, that had large Serb populations, thus “cleansing” the population of 
all non-Serb elements.  The purpose of this operation, like so many others to 
follow, was to drive out the non-Serbs from those areas of Croatia, and later 
Bosnia, that had large Serb populations, thus “cleansing” the population of all 
non-Serb elements.  In a similar aspect of the Serbian cleansing campaign, the 
Serbs would drive out non-Serbs from the Serb-dominated areas, but unlike at 
Kijevo they would seize their homes and property but not destroy it.  The purpose 
was to preserve the homes for Serb refugees returning from Croat-dominated 
regions.112 
With the onset of the genocide against the Croats in Kijevo, the next 
inevitable step in the development of general genocide was murder.  This step 
occurred in Vukovar.  On 19 November 1991, after a three-month siege that may 
have cost “thousands of lives,”113 JNA and Serb paramilitary forces entered a 
hospital in Vukovar.   Most of the patients were transferred to a warehouse, 
where they were robbed and beaten.  The next day the women and children were 
separated from the men and transported out.  The men were then tortured and  
                                                 
111 Naimark, p. 156. 
112 Generally, the Serbs and Croats forced other peoples out of their territories. For the most part the 
Bosniacs did not.  Serbs and Croat did flee from Bosnian territories, but not under the same circumstances.  
The difference here is that Serbs and Croats drove others away as a matter of policy; the Bosniacs did not.  
That being said, all parties committed the same specific acts of murder, torture, rape, etc. in the course of 
the war, but the Bosniacs did not use these as tactical weapons against the local populace. 
113 Allen, p. 55. 
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beaten again.  Finally, two hundred of the men were taken out to a farm, 
executed, and buried in a mass grave.  This was the first mass murder of the 
wars.114 
It is important to note that the victims of the Vukovar murder were Croats, 
rather than Serbs.  This pattern of torturing, expelling, and killing which first 
began in Croatia would reach horrendous levels in Bosnia.  In addition, in Bosnia 
the Serbs introduced the large-scale resurrection of concentration camps, and 
the institutionalization of rape as a weapon against the local population, rather 
than as an individual crime during war. 
The Serbs used rape to an unprecedented degree as a weapon of war.  
Rather than being an individual act committed against the victim as an individual, 
the Serbs used rape as an additional act of genocide against both the Bosnians 
and the Croats, although as with everything else, the Bosnians got the worst of it.  
Two important aspects make the Serb rape practices genocidal.  First, the 
victims were victimized because of their membership in their particular ethnic 
collectivity.  Second, the rapes were committed with the aim of destroying the 
collectivity.  It is important, although not critical, to bear in mind that throughout 
the history of warfare (and peacetime) rapes have occurred in some form in 
pretty much every war, probably by every armed force.115 
Two official reports provide documentation of the Serb practices of 
genocidal rape.  The first is the 1993 “Situation of Human Rights in the Territory 
of the Former Yugoslavia”, known as the Mazowiecki Report for its author and 
was prepared for the UN General Assembly by the Rappoorteur of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.  The second, known as the Commission of 
Experts Report, was prepared for UN Secretary-General in 1994.  Both reports 
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115 The US armed forces sadly has its own share in both peace and war, although in most cases the 
recent years among US service members the victim is usually a female service member. 
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agree that “the largest number of reported victims have been Bosnian Muslims, 
and the largest number of perpetrators have been Bosnian Serbs.”116 
This phenomenon of rape to destroy the collectivity, what Beverly Allen 
calls (correctly, I believe) genocidal rape, had several different aspects.  First of 
all, the rapes followed one of three particular patterns.  In the first pattern, Serb 
paramilitaries would enter a village and rape several women in the presence of 
others, both relatives and neighbors, and then leave.  Several days later, the 
Bosnian Serb forces or regular JNA units would arrive with the offer to grant 
permission for anyone to leave who wanted to.  Most accepted.117  The second 
common pattern was rape within the concentration camps.  The third was rape 
within brothels of sorts established throughout Serb-controlled Bosnia.  There 
was little difference between the camps and brothels.118  
Another aspect of the genocidal rape was the attitude of many of the Serb 
perpetrators of using the victims to create “little Chetniks.”  Impregnated women 
were often incarcerated until the possibility of an abortion was too late.  The idea 
was that the baby would be a Serb, thus contributing to the overall destruction of 
the Bosnian Muslim national identity.119 
Allen correctly assesses the absurdity of this notion:  The genetic material 
would be half of the mother’s, rather than all of the father’s anyway.  And unless 
the mother was murdered, she usually was the one who kept the child, and 
contributed to its cultural development, which would most assuredly not be a 
Serb heritage.  Additionally, many women abandoned their children in the 
refugee hospitals, where the children entered into some form of social welfare 
system.  This hardly contributed to an upbringing as a Serb.  Thus it is highly 
                                                 
116 Allen, p. 47, quoting the UN Commission of Experts Report.   The Mazowiecki Report 
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doubtful that very many of these “little Chetniks” were actually born or raised in 
the Republika Srbska or Serbia, nor were they raised as Serbs.  However, this 
logic doesn’t change the fact that the Serb perpetrators did, in fact, very often 
believe their own rhetoric.  This attitude makes the perpetrator view the victim as 
nothing more than a “container”, an attitude that many of the severely 
traumatized victims themselves may have gained.  Everywhere the rapes were 
accompanied by the most inhumane tortures and atrocities. 
By and large the purpose of the rape regime in Bosnia was to drive the 
Bosnian Muslims out of the Serb-dominated areas, as part of the overall ethnic 
cleansing.  “The idea was to instill terror in the local Muslim population and to get 
them to run for their lives.”120  That being said, the Serbs, like the Nazis, still 
made the price of leaving very high.  In one example, in the city of Banja Luka, 
Bosnian Muslims who wanted to leave after the Serbs took control of the city 
had to visit numerous municipal offices and pay fees at each one 
during certain periods.  The fees and regulations changed all the 
time…It was necessary to go to numerous municipal offices for 
telephones, electricity, to the bank to certify that you didn’t owe 
them anything each time you went and obtain a receipt so that you 
would be permitted to be ethnically cleansed.121 
After being driven out, the refugees were still far from safe.  By the time a 
Muslim refugee group finally reached a safe refugee center, it would have been 
robbed several times, and be completely destitute.  This was not, however, a 
coordinated, directed action by the Serb leadership.  It was purely brigandage.  
Frequently the buses would be stopped and the men would be taken off.  
Sometimes they were taken to a nearby prison camp, or sent to a labor battalion.  
Sometimes they were just executed outright.122 
Unlike the Nazis, the Serbs did not have an “expulsion policy”, per se.  
They had a general plan that provided guidelines to the subordinate units; 
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121 Naimark, p. 166 quoting Diana Paul, a human rights worker in Banja Luka. 
122 Naimark, p. 163. 
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namely to drive off non-Serb populations in order to create homogeneous Serb 
regions.  This was done with a variety of methods.  One method was to instill 
terror into the local population through rapes, torture, and murder. In this way, the 
rest of the population would be less willing to resist.  Another method was to 
simply drive everyone out by force, and kill anyone who resisted. 
In conjunction with the goal of driving out the Muslims was the apparent 
phenomenon of punishing the Bosnian Muslims for their very existence, in a 
sense to punish them for having to make the Serbs drive them out.  This bizarre 
punishment for it own sake was accomplished largely through the concentration 
camps established throughout Serb-controlled territories of Bosnia.  These 
facilities were the scenes of some of the most horrid inhumanities of the entire 
conflict.  There is no need to go into an unending litany of the atrocities 
committed in such places as Keraterm and Omarska.  Suffice to say that the 
prisoners were subjected to all forms of senseless abuse, beatings, random 
killings, tortures, and rapes (males as well as females, of all ages).  Frequently 
detainees were allowed to leave after being forced to commit savage atrocities 
themselves, such as killing or even raping their own relatives.  The accounts of 
survivors are a sickening recollection of pure evil sadism.  The one mystery of 
the camps is whether or not the Bosnian Serb leadership knew what was going 
on there.  Confirmation of the existence of concentration camps came in August 
1992 when Roy Gutman was granted permission by Karadzic to visit Omarska.  
The theory is that if Karadzic knew what was going on, he never would have 
permitted a journalist to have access.123 
Beyond driving out the Bosnian Muslims, the Serbs also took steps to 
ensure that any reminder of them was destroyed to ensure they never returned.  
This was accomplished partly through the deliberate destruction of cultural 
monuments and religious locations.  In Banja Luka, the Serbs destroyed 200 
mosques out of 202 in 1993.  Even non-Serb cemeteries were “routinely 
                                                 
123 Judah, p. 225-241 and Naimark, p. 160-167. 
 60
destroyed, in order to erase any memory of the non-Serbian peoples and their 
culture.”124  These destructions were not random, according to Philip J. Cohen, 
but were “carried out through a deliberate pattern of destruction of … institutions 
that define the collective identity of the targeted community.”125 
Besides the rapes and the forced expulsions, the genocide in Bosnia was 
accompanied by significant numbers of mass murders, although nowhere near 
the scale of the genocide of the Nazis.  There is a debate about just how many 
people were murdered during the Bosnian genocide, with numbers ranging from 
as high as 200,000 to perhaps some 25,000.  The number of 200,000 had no 
basis in fact but was nonetheless accepted for several years as being accurate. 
In fact, this figure apparently came from a speech by the Bosnian Deputy 
Minister of Information, Senada Kreso, on 28 June 1993, but was unconfirmed.  
Another figure floated around by the Bosnian government was 128,444 in 
December 1992.  The Bosnian Foreign Minister may have derived this number 
form the 17,466 confirmed dead with the estimated 111,000 missing, which 
probably included large numbers of unaccounted refugees.  The International 
Red Cross estimated casualties may be as high as 35,000 on all sides.126 
These numbers come from an article by former deputy head of Yugoslav 
Affairs at the State Department, George Kenney.  His article, written in April 
1995, predates the worst massacre in forty-five years in Europe.  In July 1995, 
Bosnian Serb forces under Mladic murdered in excess of thousands Bosnian 
                                                 
124 Philip J. Cohen, “The Complicity of Serbian intellectuals” in Thomas Cushman and 
Stejpan G. Mestrovic, This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New 
York: New York University Press, 1996) p. 47.   
125 Ibid. 
126 George Kenney, “The Bosnian Calculation: How Many Have Died?  Not Nearly as Many 
as Some Would Have You Think”, The New York Times Magazine (New York, April 13, 1995) p. 
42-43.  Kenney wrote this article partly in response to an earlier article of his in 1992, in which he 
urged the West to intervene in Bosnia to stop the Serbs.  He wrote in this earlier piece that “in 
territory which Serbian covet outside of Sarajevo there may yet be more than half a million non-
Serb Bosnians; the Serbian swill not rest until these people are killed or removed.”  Form “Time to 
Start Up the Tanks”, The Guardian (London, September 4, 1992) p. 19.  His New York Magazine 
article end with the following “As long as the world tosses around words like “genocide” so 
loosely, the present tragedy will revolve endlessly.  Counts count.” 
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Muslim men from the UN safe area.  Exact figures are unavailable, but most 
sources agree with six to eight thousand victims.127 
Although Srebrenica represented the single largest mass murders, 
hundreds of others, perhaps thousands, were victims of much smaller-scale 
summary executions.  Very often men of military age (loosely defined as 16 to 
65, but the Serbs didn’t seem to trouble themselves too much with the particulars 
anyway) were taken off refugee buses and shot on the spot.  Just as often they 
were shot when the Serbs first entered a Bosniac town.  The purposes of these 
killings were the same as all the other atrocities committed: induce the Muslins to 
leave as rapidly as possible, and never come back.  Of course, much of the 
atrocities were pure lawlessness by the many bands of paramilitaries and gangs 
that also loosely fell under the Bosnian Serb Army.  Nonetheless, the Serbian 
leadership was accountable for the acts committed in their name.  The UN 
Commission of experts Report states: 
 
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the practices of 
``ethnic cleansing'' were not coincidental, sporadic or carried out by 
disorganized groups or bands of civilians who could not be 
controlled by the Bosnian-Serb leadership. Indeed, the patterns of 
conduct, the manner in which these acts were carried out, the 
length of time over which they took place and the areas in which 
they occurred combine to reveal a purpose, systematicity and some 
planning and coordination from higher authorities. Furthermore, 
these practices are carried out by persons from all segments of the 
Serbian population in the areas described: members of the army, 
militias, special forces, the police and civilians. Lastly, the 
Commission notes that these unlawful acts are often heralded by 
the perpetrators as positive, patriotic accomplishments.128 
                                                 
127 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2000) p. 
67-68 cites 8,000 victims.  Naimark, p. 164-165 cites 6,000-8,000.  Other sources provide 
comparable figures. 
128 United Nations Security Council, “Final Report of the Commission of Experts” (New York, 
the United Nations, 27 May 1994), Part III: General Studies, Section B: “Ethnic Cleansing” 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This works has looked at parts of both the genocide of the Jews in the 
World War II Holocaust, and the genocide of the Bosnian Muslins in Bosnia in the 
1990s Balkans conflict.  After considering these two atrocities, several common 
themes become apparent.  Before entering into a discussion of them, however, a 
few points must be clear. 
First, these are not meant to be thought of as “variables” in a political 
science sense.  In no way does this work suggest that certain elements must be 
present in order for genocide to result.  Genocides take many different forms.  
Rwanda, for example, is far different from the Balkans even though both 
occurred at approximately the same time.  This work has been an historical look 
at two separate events, and is in no way meant to be all-inclusive.  Nor should 
the reader even take it as a model for all twentieth-century European genocides.  
Norman Naimark does an admirable job of presenting historical overviews of 
these cases in Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, 
and has been a significant source for this work. 
Precisely because Naimark’s work is one of the most all-inclusive on the 
topic, there is one critical aspect of his that must, of academic and historical 
necessity, be challenged; that of the notion that genocides and ethnic cleansings 
are not the same.  This will be discussed later, but for now we will consider the 
common themes mentioned earlier.  These are the stepping-stones to begin to 
answer the question “How does nationalism become genocidal?” 
 
A. THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE 
In both cases of genocide, the genocide had its origins in long-standing 
nationalist tensions.  Both the anti-Semitism of the Germans and the anti-Muslim 
sentiments of the Serbs go back to the Kulturnation of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, although it must be qualified in the case of Yugoslavia.  
There, the nation that desired a state was the Serb nation, with a desire for a 
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greater Serbia, that pre-dates the twentieth century.  The Serb nationalism had 
little real desire for a multiethnic national identity, unless it was in a state 
dominated by Serbs.  When the first Yugoslavia was created in the aftermath of 
World War I, “the Serbs saw the state’s creation as a final reward for their long 
history of battle and sacrifice on behalf of the South Slavs, and they assumed 
Serbs would govern and rule it…”129 
Neither the Nazis nor the Serbs necessarily represented pre-existing 
popular sentiment.  The nationalist extremism that they espoused certainly had 
its roots in the nations’ histories, but the leaders hijacked it for their own 
purposes.  In relating Milosevic’s visit to Kosovo Polje in 1987, Naimark writes 
that when the crowd started chanted his name in response to a statement of his 
“Milosevic understood immediately the intoxicating power of nationalist 
rhetoric.”130  The nationalist leaders used this extreme sentiment to their own 
purposes, as a tool to consolidate political power and support. 
To this end, we can make the statement that one aspect of the genocides 
in the Holocaust and Serbia comes from the individual “cult of personality” of both 
Hitler and Milosevic.  While it would be irresponsible to say that without them 
neither of the wars would have occurred, it would be safe to say they certainly 
contributed immensely to working the public sentiment into the necessary frenzy 
that directed led to genocide. 
While a significant amount of the blame rests on the individual leaders, 
and an equal amount on their immediate lieutenants, some blame must also rest 
on the people of the aggressor nation.  In both cases, the atrocities committed 
were  so  widespread  that  they  involved  vast  numbers of soldiers, civilians,  
                                                 
129 Naimark, p. 145. 
130 Naimark, p. 151.  This was two years before his famous Battle of Kosovo anniversary 
rally.  Kosovo Serbs had been alleging for years they were victimized and discriminated against 
by the majority Kosovar Albanians.  On his visit, Milosevic stated that “no one should dare to beat 
you.”  Judah, p. 162. 
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paramilitaries, and bureaucrats.  Occasionally the clergy was involved to a 
certain extent through complicity.  Therefore, to some degree all parts of society 
had some part. 
Many of the active participants claim they were forced to take part.  The 
myth certain exists today that if one did not follow orders, one would quickly find 
oneself facing the firing squad, or marching into the gas chambers.  At least in 
the case of the Nazi genocide, we now know this to be completely false.  The 
Nazis did not kill those who refused to participate.  Friedlander writes that the 
physicians who participated were all recruited, and they “agreed to serve as 
experts; only two institutional directors quietly left the meeting and thereafter 
declined to cooperate.”131  Regarding the firing squad executioners of the east, 
Christopher Browning writes that “a few committed, full-time killers and a 
sufficient supply of short-term executioners were enough to get the job done and 
even allowed a small minority to consistently abstain without facing serious 
repercussions.”132  Similarly, in his landmark work of the role of “ordinary” 
Germans and their participation in the Holocaust, Goldhagen writes in Hitler’s 
Willing Executioners that “never in the history of the Holocaust was a German, 
SS man or otherwise, killed, sent to a concentration camp, jailed, or punished in 
any serious way for refusing to kill Jews.”133  The Nazis were willing to tolerate 
non-participation, so long as it did not actually interfere or threaten the programs 
or their exposure.  Those who did speak out against the murders, or who were 
caught helping Jews, did face punishment, usually in the form of incarceration at 
a concentration camp rather than being sent east to the death camps. 
The same cannot necessarily be said of Bosnian Serbs who chose not to 
participate.  Since many of the aggressors were raised from local militias, they 
were frequently known to their victims.  Often during interviews by investigators, 
                                                 
131 Friedlander, p. 78. 
132 Browning, p. 298. 
133 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 
p. 379. 
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the victims (mostly women victims of rapes) relate that their aggressors stated 
they were being forced to conduct the rapes and tortures.  While we do not know 
with any certainty, the Summaries and Conclusions to the Annexes of the UN 
Commission of Experts Report states that in the Bosnian Serb camps “there 
were also reports of Serbs who were detained in Serb-controlled facilities.  In 
those cases, the prisoners had usually refused to participate in the conquest of a 
region or in the activities of “ethnic cleansing”.  Those imprisoned Serbs were 
treated as poorly as the other prisoners.”134  However, although many may have 
felt coerced into the acts they committed, when we consider the vigor and 
enthusiasm with which these same individuals committed their atrocities, we 
have to wonder.  It is this willing and eager participation of both the rank and file 
Bosnian Serbs and Germans that indicate that, beyond themselves as 
individuals, themselves as members of their collective nation bear a substantial 
part of the blame for the nationalism becoming genocidal.  While the leaders 
used the rhetoric of national extremism for their own power plays, the “masses” 
bought into it in one form or another.  Part of this must take into account the 
circumstances of the time for the country. 
Germany in the 1920s was in a low state when the Nazi party began to 
gain support.  As Peter Fritzsche discusses in Germans into Nazis, the origins of 
National Socialism are found in the days preceding the First World War, rather 
than in the defeat and humiliation of Versailles.  However, Versailles can be 
thought of as the enabler that helped to bring the Nazis to power.  There is 
certainly some element of truth to the notion that Versailles was an unjust peace 
for the Germans.  A few short years later the Germans suffered an additional 
humiliation when the French occupied the Ruhr, followed immediately by 
hyperinflation.  The experiment of democracy under the Weimar Republic was 
failing to provide basic security and economic stability.  A civil war was raging 
                                                 
134 United Nations Security Council, Annex Summaries and Conclusions to the Final Report 
of the Commission of Experts (New York: The United Nations, 28 December 1993), Annex VIII: 
Prison Camps, Section IIC1: Bosnian Serb Controlled Camps.  
www.essuwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/Summary.htm. 
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between various factions like the Nazis, the Freikorps, the Socialists, and the 
Communists.  By the early 1930s Germany, along with the rest of the world, was 
living under the Great Depression.    Against these conditions Hitler came to 
power, and his rhetoric appealed to the dissatisfaction of many conservative 
elements.  As Browning mentions, compared with these other hardships, Hitler’s 
anti-Semitism in the early years just wasn’t that much of an issue for most.  By 
1939, after years of nationalist rhetoric in which the Jews were only one targeted 
element, the people were willing to accept war to protect the Volk.  The 
generation prior had become desensitized to large-scale killing on the battlefields 
of World War I, and the new war put the next generation into a frame of mind to 
participate in the mass killings in Poland and then in the Soviet Union.  By late 
1941, the German losses had grown substantially to rival those of the previous 
war, and the public probably just didn’t care anymore what happened to the Jews 
of the Reich compared to the deaths of German soldiers in the east.  Basically, 
once the killing started, it became easier to expand it to new elements of the 
society, and the genocide of the Jews became substance. 
Similarly, although hardly equally, Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990 was 
in turmoil.  As has been discussed, most scholars agree that the 1990s ethnic 
conflicts had their origins in the ethnic hatreds of World War II.  Following the 
war, Tito’s regime put a stop to the ethnic violence, but exactly how this affected 
the nations is debated.  Two theories exist to describe Tito’s affect on nationalism 
within Yugoslavia.  One theory, the “freezer model”, says that Tito’s regime kept 
the rampant nationalism of World War II in check by forcing Croats, Serbs, 
Slovenes, and Muslims to work together.  Following Tito’s demise, nationalism 
picked up right where it left off in 1945.  The other theory is the “incubator 
model.”  In this model Tito’s practice of balancing nationalist sentiments by taking 
from one and giving to another, always changing with time and circumstance, 
eventually  angered  all and worsened nationalist hatred.135  One element that is  
                                                 
135 Naimark, p. 146. 
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present in both theories is pre-existing nationalist hatreds.  They may not be 
ancient hatreds, but nonetheless there are hatreds that predate Milosevic, 
Tudjman, and Karadzic. 
Tito’s 1974 constitution only helped make the tensions worse.  It provided 
for a weak central government with strong republic governments, and it granted 
autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina from Serbia, a move than only angered the 
Serbs.  With Tito’s death, the strengthened republics began to advance their own 
nationalist, and separatist, agendas.  Both Serbia and Croatia, the two strongest 
republics, began to manipulate the federal government for their own nationalist 
agendas.  The situation was worsened by the economic crisis Yugoslavia faced 
in the 1980s.  There was high inflation and high unemployment rates.  These 
conditions fueled the desires of Croatia and Slovenia, the two wealthier republics, 
to break loose from the “sinking ship of Yugoslavia”, and from blatant Serb 
domination of the federal government in particular.136 
We can therefore see some similarities in the environments that helped to 
make nationalism turn genocidal in both conflicts.  However, unlike the Germans 
in 1941, the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims in 1991 did not live in an 
environment in which large-scale death had desensitized them.  However, they 
did live in an environment in which there was a recent history of mass ethnic 
violence.  Thus while virtually none of the participants of the 1990s had been 
around during the last round of mass death in the Balkans, it had been a fact of 
life for their parents and families, which may have been an adequate enough 
substitute to allow a ready acceptance of and desensitization to extreme violence 
and atrocities. 
 
B. THE ACTS OF GENOCIDE 
The previous two chapters have largely addressed some of the aspects of 
the acts of genocide committed during the wars.  What becomes readily apparent 
                                                 
136 Naimark, p. 147 and p. 155. 
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is that there is a wide range of actions that lead up to, and constitute, genocide 
short of total physical annihilation.  In both cases, the genocides did not 
necessarily begin as planned campaigns to kill every member of the victim group. 
In the case of the Nazis, the genocide campaign began by acts aimed at 
protecting the racial purity of the Germans.  For this reason the first victims were 
the handicapped adults.  At the same time, the foreign elements (the Jews) were 
being induced to leave voluntarily through actions and laws designed to make 
their lives in Germany unbearable.  Once the war started the weak Germans (the 
handicapped infants, children, and adults) were purged through murder while the 
foreign elements were purged through relocations, expulsions, ghettoization and 
murder in the newly conquered territories.  Only when the number of Jews 
became too much to even consider expelling did the leadership search for a 
method of mass extermination.  Firing squads proved, through the experiences of 
the Soviet front, to be unsuitable for a number of practical reasons, and the 
architects of the extermination looked to the “medical” procedures of the first 
victims as a model. 
In the Balkans, the first acts were neither as suitable nor as gradual.  Nor 
were they as centrally controlled.  The Serbs began used a combination of 
methods to remove the foreign elements from their conquered territories.  In 
many cases they created conditions intended to make the foreign elements 
willingly leave and never return, through acts of terror.  In other cases the Serbs 
simply drove them out by force, and in still other cases they incarcerated 
everyone in camps as a prelude to forced deportation.  All stages of the Serb 
campaign included mass murders, but the campaign never reached the stages of 
complete physical annihilation like the Nazi extermination camps. 
The reason this never occurred in Bosnia has nothing to do with a 
supposed difference between “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”.  The reason is, 
simply, that the Serb campaign of genocide was successful without needing to 
resort to mass extermination.  Once the Serbs controlled the areas they wanted, 
the fighting front stabilized.  Because of the much smaller numbers involved, and 
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the much smaller geographical area involved, it actual was practical and possible 
to  drive  the  Bosnians Muslims and Croats out, and then destroy any remaining  
elements of their culture and heritage.137  Bear in mind that the Nazis 
transitioned to the Final Solution because they couldn’t get rid of all the Jews 
otherwise. 
 
C. GENOCIDE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Chapter II discussed the international agreement and treaties that 
governed genocide and laws of war that prohibit acts that are genocidal even 
when not called such.  It also addressed the academic work of Raphael Lemkin 
in describing genocide, and the some discussion about whether “ethnic 
cleansing” and “genocide” are different. 
This work has supported the argument that these two crimes are not 
different.  Ethnic cleansing is one form of genocide, as mass extermination is 
another.  Ethnic cleansing seeks to destroy a nation every bit as much as mass 
extermination does.  When the purpose is to remove an entire people from their 
lands and homes, to drive them off by force, terror, and violence, then it is 
genocide, plain and simple.  Therefore, the Serbs unequivocally committed 
genocide against the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina in the 1990s. 
To put a more practical bent on the argument, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has indicted seventeen people on the 
charge of Genocide, all Serbs.  To date, three have been acquitted and one more 
has been acquitted but convicted of Aiding and Abetting the Complicity to 
Commit Genocide.  Four others plead guilty to lesser charges of Crimes Against 
Humanity and Violations of the Laws of War, and so the charges of Genocide 
were dismissed.  One case was dropped after the defendant died of natural 
causes.  Four suspects still remain at large, including Karadzic and Mladic.  
Three trials are currently ongoing at the time of this writing, including the trial of 
                                                 
137 See Naimark, p. 166 for a discussion of some of the numbers involved. 
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Slobodan Milosevic.138  Only one defendant has been convicted of Genocide, 
Radislav Krstic, the commander of the Drina Corps and one of the men 
responsible for the Srebrenica massacre.  However, the commandants of both 
Omarska (Zeljko Meakic) and Keratim (Dusko Sikirica) Concentration Camps 
were charged with Genocide.  Both men plead guilty to lesser charges, however. 
At this time, we have yet to know all the facts of the Balkans conflicts.  
Two of the most wanted war criminals remain at large, and one other is still in 
trial.  While we have a fairly clear idea of the facts of the conflict, such as who did 
what to whom, we do not yet have a full understanding the reasons behind those 
facts.  Volumes of information have been collected over the past several years 
from on-site investigations and interviews with thousands of survivors.  But solid 
academic work on the Balkans may be decades away yet.  Some of the best 
works on the genocide of the Second World War are only a few years old. 
Nevertheless, we cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the genocide in 
Bosnia as a useful tool in future conflict management simply because we are 
waiting for somebody to write the definitive history.  We must accept that wars 
will continue to happen, and that the potential for ethnic violence and genocide is 
always present, even in the most advanced countries.  It is purely coincidental, 
but an interesting point anyway, that the Olympics occurred in both Berlin and 
Sarajevo a few short years prior to the outbreak of conflict in both places.  In the 
future, the international community must be ever-vigilant for signs that a conflict 
may turn genocidal, because it could happen again. 
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